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ABSTRACT
In the following, which is divided into three sections, I
discuss the role played by speaker intentions in determining
the reference of demonstratives and definite descriptions.
The general conclusion drawn is that while speaker intentions
do indeed play some such role, that role is a limited one:
other factors come into play in determining the reference of
demonstratives and definite descriptions.
In the first of the three sections ("Three Views of
Demonstrative Reference") , I examine contextual, intentional,
and quasi-intententional views of demonstrative reference.
According to the first, advocated by Wettstein, McGinn, et
al., the demonstratum of a demonstrative expression is
determined entirely by certain publicly accessible features of
the context (such as ostensive gestures); intentions play no
role at all. According to the second, recently advocated by
Kaplan, intentions play a "criterial" role in the
determination of the demonstratum; contextual features (such
as ostensive gestures) are said to have no more than a
pragmatic significance. According to the third, sketched
briefly by Kaplan in the final pages of "Dthat," intentions
play a role - albeit a limited one - in the securing of
demoaistrata. I argue that the third view is the only one of
the three with any plausibility, and then go on to develop a
version of the view that accommodates certain cases that the
version sketched in "Dthat" is unable to accommodate.
In the second section ("The Maximal Salience Theoriy of
Definite Descriptions"), I look at a certain theory of
definite descriptions: the "maximal salience theory."
According to this view, advocated by Lewis, McCawley, et al.,
an expression of the form "the F" denotes the most salient of
the F's in the contextually delimited domain of discourse. An
occurrence of "The F is G" is thus said to be true just in
case the most salient of the F's in the domain of discourse is
G. After motivating the maximal salience theory (by defending
Lewis' claim that it circumvents a problem intractable for any
Russellian approach to descriptions), I draw attention to
certain counter-examples to that theory. I then present and
respond to Lewis' recently revised version of the maximal
salience theory, which was devised in order to accommodate the
counter-examples in question. I argue that the revised version
- though it manages to accommodate the particul.r cases it was
designed to accommodate - fails in the end, as it fails to
take into consideration the semantic significance of
referential intentions.
In the third and final section ("Demonstrating with
Descriptions"), I look at FKaplan's attempt to extend his
recently advocated intentional view of demonstrative
reference, to the so-called "referential use" of definite
descriptions. Kaplan suggests that referentially used
expressions of the form "the F" be parsed as "that, the F,"
where the appositive description functions as a kind of
demonstration, and is thus of merely pragmatic significance.
The referential intention of the speaker is (according to
Kaplan) what does the semantic work; it is the intention that
secures the demonstratum. I concede that such a view has some
initial plausibility when applied to cases where the
description (the "demonstration") is only slightly off-target
(that is, where the description only slightly misdescribes the
intended referent). However, I go on to argue that the view
has no plausibility when applied to cases where the
description is very wide of the intended mark (where it
radically misdescribes the intended referent). I then sketch
two alternative accounts of referentially used descriptions,
neither of which assigns a "criterial" (semantic) role to
referential intentions. The proposed accounts are recommended
on the grounds that they accommodate caset where the
description radically misdescribes the intended referent, as
well as cases where the description only slightly misdescribes
that entity.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Richard Cartwright
Title: Professor of Philosophy
THREE VIEWS OF DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE
1. Preliminaries
Over a dozen years ago, David Kaplan proposed an intuitively
plausible view as to the role played by speaker intentions in
determining demonstrata.1 According to this view, sketched
briefly in the final pages of "Dthat" (Kaplan, 1979),
intentions play a role - albeit a limited one - in such
determination.
The intuitive plausibility of this "quasi-intentional" view of
demonstrative reference was borne out by a consideration of
two sorts of cases: cases where an accompanying demonstration
seemed quite clearly to override a conflicting intention; and
cases where it seemed necessary to invoke intentions in order
to account for the fact that a particular object or individual
- the intended demonstratum2 - was secured as the actual
demonstratum. Cases of the first sort appeared to show that
the role played by speaker intentions in demonstrative
reference was, at most, a limited one, while cases of the
second sort seemed to show that there was indeed some such
role played by intentions.
With respect to caaes of the first sort, Kaplan imagined a
scenario in which he wrongly supposed himself to be pointing
to a picture of Carnap (the intended demonstratum), while
uttering "Dthat is a picture of one of the greatest
philosophers of the twentieth century. " We were to suppose
that Kaplan wasn't looking where he was pointing, and that he
was actually pointing to a picture of Agnew. (The picture of
Carnap had recently been replaced with one of Agnew,
unbeknownst to rKaplan.) The intuition was that Kaplan had just
said something about the picture of Agnew - despite his
intention to say something about the picture of Carnap. For
the intuition was that Kaplan's utterance was false, and that
it was false on account of the fact that the picture of Agnew
did not picture "one of the greatest philosophers of the
twentieth century." This was supposed, not implausibly, to
lend credence to the view that the role played by spealker
intentions in securing demonstrata was, at most, a limited
one. For in the case in question, the intended demonstratum:
the object the speaker intended to demonstrate, and say
something of, failed to emerge as the actual demonstratum: the
object the speaker actually succeeded in saying something of.
In order to show that intentions did indeed play some role in
determining demonstrata, Kaplan went on to draw attention to
two sorts of cases: cases where the demonstrative utterance
was accompanied by a vague gesture in the general direction of
the intended demonstratumP and cases where the demonstrative
utterance was accompanied by a more focused demonstration.
Both sorts of cases seemed to show t  hat intentions
occasionally needed to be invoked in order to explain
demonstrative reference.
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Let's look at the cases involving vague demonstrations first.
Suppose, for instance, that I issue a vague demonstration -
say, a casual wave of the hand - in the general direction of a
particular dog (my intended demonstratum), while Littering
"That is Fido." And suppose that, in so doing, I
simultaneously gesture in the general direction of a host of•
other things: a clump of clover, a nearby pond, a neighbor's
cat. Surely none of this is going to prevent the dog in
question from emerging as the demonstratum of the
demonstrative expression occurring in my utterance. For surely
the truth or falsity of what I have said is going to depend
upon whether or not the intended demonstratum is in fact Fido.
(What I have said is not going to be rendered false on account
of the fact that neither the clump of clover, the nearby pond,
nor the neighbor's cat, is identical with Fido. Nor will what
I have said be rendered "indeterminate" on account of the fact
that my gesture was as much in the general direction of those
other things, as it was in the general direction of the
intended demonstratum.) One natural way to account for this
phenomenon, would be to suppose that my intention to
demonstrate, and say something of, the dog in question - as
opposed to the clover, the pond, or the cat - has the effect
of "disambiguating" my vague demonstration, and thus securing
that dog as the demonstratum.
In fact, as Kaplan suggested in "Dthat," any case where a
demonstrative utterance is accompanied by ostension - whether
vague or focused - tends to support the view that intentions
,7"N
play at least a limited role in determining demonstrata.m For
whenever you gesture at one thing, you simultaneously gesture
at other things as well - from the "surveyor's point of
view."1 Ostension thus appears to be invariably indeterminate:
No gesture, by itself, can "pick out" a unique object or
individual. Suppose, for instance, that while uttering "That
is Fido," I point directly at a particular dog (my intended
demonstratum). Now when I point at that dog, I also point
(from the "surveyor's point of view") at his coat, at a
section of his coat, perhaps at a flea on that coat, etc.
Nevertheless, the intuition is surely that the dog in question
- the intended demonstratum - emerges as the actual
demonstratum. For it would certainly appear as though the
truth or falsity of what I have said is going to depend upon
the properties of that dog - and not upon those of his coat, a
section of his coat, a flea on that coat, etc. And a natural
way of accounting for this apparent fact, would be to suppose
that my intention to demonstrate, and say something of, a
particular dog - and not any of those other things - serves to
"disambiguate" my gesture and thus fix that dog as the
demonstratum of the demonstrative expression occurring in my
utterance. Indeed, it is not easy to see how else one could
account for the dog's emerging as the demonstratum. Thus,
regardless of whether an accompanying demonstration is vague
or focused, intentions would appear to be required in order to
account for the fact that a particular object or individual -
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the intended demonstratum - manages to get secured as the
actual demonstratum.
At the very least, then, the view of demonstrative reference
sketched in "Dthat" - according to which intentions play a
limited role in such reference - has intuitive plausibility in
its favor. Recently, however, there has been a marked tendency
to reject such a view in favor of an "all or nothing" picture
of the role played by intentions in determining demonstrata.
There have been several philosophers, including Kaplan (1989)
and Donnellan, 7 who have argued that intentions play a
"criterial"a role in the determination of demonstrata: being
the intended demonstratum is the "criterion" for emerging as
the actual demonstratum. These Gricean-minded philosophers
view accompanying demonstrations as playing no more than the
pragmatic role of facilitating communication: of assisting the
hearer in identifying the intended demonstratum. Decause the
import of demonstrations is viewed as merely pragmatic, a
wayward demonstration can never (on the view in question)
override a conflicting intenention. If the speaker intends to
demonstrate, and say something of x, then even if he
mistakenly demonstrates y, x will nevertheless emerge as the
actual demonstratum: the object or individual about which
something has been said. Of course, in the event that the
speaker demonstrates y, the hearer might naturally take y to
be the intended demonstratum. Thus, while failed communication
may well be a consequence of wayward demonstration, failed
reference can never be.
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There have also been a number ot philosophers who have taken
the opposite view, arguing that intentions play no role
whatsoever in the securing of demonstrata. Several of these
Wittgensteinian-minded philosophers, including Mc~inn (1981)
and Wettstein (1984), have contended that demc)nstrata are
determined entirely by certain contextual (as opposed to
"speaker internal") features of the demonstrative utterance."
Different versions of the same basic view emerge as a result
of disagreement over just what the relevant contextual
features are. According to McGinn's version of the contextual
view, the only contextual feature relevant to the
determination of the demonstratium is the ostensive gesture. 10
According to Wettstein's version of the contextual view, the
relevant contextual features are certain publicly accessible1 1
"cues," exploited by the speaker in his attempt to communicate
about a particular object or individual. Wettstein (like
McGinn) regards accompanying demonstrations as playing a
genuine semantic role in demonstrative reference. For such
gestures constitute publicly accessible cues of the sort in
question. However, Wettstein regards ostensive gestures as
constituting just one of several types of semantically
significant cues. Other such cues (discussed in section 2
below) have to do with relations obtaining between the words
comprising the sentence uttered, and particular features of
the context.'2 But according to either version of the
contextual view, if x is the object or individual indicated by
6
the relevant contextual features, then x is the demonstratum-
even if y is the intended demonstratum. That a demonstratum
may be secured despite the indeterminacy of ostension, is
accounted for (oan Wettstein's view 1 3 ) by appealing - not to
speaker intentions - but to other (speaker external) features
of the context. (In section 2 below, we will see just what
these other features are supposed to be.)
In what follows, I intend to argue that the currently popular
"all or nothing" views concerning the role played by speaker
intentions in demonstrative reference are wrong, and that a
version of the quasi-intentional view proposed by Kaplan in
"Dthat," is more in line with the linguistic data. I do not
intend to provide a fully worked out theory of demonstrative
reference. What I do intend to do, is argue that - whatever
the details of the correct theory of demonstrative reference
turn out to be - that theory will be a quasi-intentional
theory of the sort sketched in "Dthat."
The format of this paper is as follows. In section 2, after
spelling out the details of the "contextual " view of
demonstrative reference, I consider the particular advantages
and disadvantages of that view. I then do the same for the
"intentional" view. And then, after briefly reviewing the
virtues of the quasi-intentional view of "Dthat," I draw
attention to a seeming difficulty with that view. The
difficulty involves the apparent inability of the view to
account for the fact that, in cases where a wayward
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demonstration overrides a conflicting intention, a determinate
proposition is nevertheless expressed. In section 3, I go on
to sketch and argue for a modified version of the view
proposed in "Dthat," in which intentions are assigned a
limited role in oemonstrative reference. (The modifications
result from attempting to accommodate the phenomena discussed
in the previous section.) And finally, in section 4, I
conclude with a quick survey of what I take this paper to have
established - and what remains (concerning demonstrative
reference) to be established.
2. Currently Available Views of Demonstrative Reference
(a) The Contextual View
Common to any view of the sort which I have chosen to describe
as "contextual," is the idea that speaker intentions have
nothing whatsoever to do with the determination of
demonstrata. According to any such view, demonstrata are
determined entirely by certain publicly accessible features of
the context. So far as I am aware, the most thoroughly
developed and persuasively argued version of the contextual
view, is that provided by Howard Wettstein in "How to Bridge
the Gap Between Meaning and Reference" (1984). 4  For this
reason, I will focus my analysis of the view in question
around Wettstein's particular version of that view.'"
Wettstein's contextual view is formulated in response to a
well-known difficulty concerning the reference of
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demonstrative (and, more generally, indexical) expressions.
Despite the "meager lexical meaning" of expressions like
"this" and "that," tokens of such expressions nevertheless
manage to achieve determinate reference. A question thus
arises: What factor(s) conjoin with the lexical meanings of
demonstratives to determine demonstrata? What (in other, words)
"bridges the gap" between the meaning and the reference of
such expressions?
Before spelling out the details of his response to this query,
Wettstein sketches a particular view of language, to which
that response is designed to conform. The view is the well-
known Wittgensteinian one, according to which language is
properly regarded as a kind of social institution. Wettstein's
solution to the problem of how to "bridge the gap" between the
meaning and the reference of demonstrative expressions,
coheres well with this Wittgensteinian picture of language.
Wettstein argues that the "gap" in question is to be "bridged"
by the "very features which make the reference available to
the auditor." (Wettstein, 1984, p. 64) These features are
appropriately labelled "cues." And the particular cues which
fix the reference of a token demonstrative are those for which
the speaker is "responsible, those that he, to all
appearances, exploits..." ' in his attempt to communicate about
a particular object or individual. For,
One who utters a demonstrative is responsible, from the
point of view of the natural language institution, for
making his reference available to his addressee, and so
is responsible for the cues that a competent and
9
attentive addressee would take him to be exploiting.
(Wettstein, 1984, pp. 72-73)
The particular cues which determine demonstrative reference -
those which the speaker, "to all appearances, exploits" -
include more than just accompanying demonstrations. Several
such cues have to do with relations obtaining between the
particular expressions comprising the sentence uttered, and
particular features of the context of the utterance. Consider
an utterance (unaccompanied by ostension) of "That dog belongs
to me," made in a context containing either a single or most
salient canine. In either case, the common noun "dog,"
conjoined with the uniqueness/maximal salience of a particular
canine, would (according to Wettstein) provide a cue of the
sort in question. For in the absence of any other helpful cues
(such as a demonstration), it is natural to suppose that the
speaker is relying, at least in part, on the common noun "dog"
to convey to the hearer the identity of the intended
demonstratum.
Wettstein also believes that the predicate contained in the
sentence uttered, might constitute a semantically significant
cue, given the appropriate contextual circumstances. To see
this, consider an utterance (unaccompanied by ostension) of
"That is my dog," made in a context containing a single
canine, situated amongst a number of felines. And suppose
that, at the time of the utterance, the dog is no more salient
than any of the cats. In such a case, the predicate "is my
dog," conjoined with the contextual uniqueness of a particular
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canine, would (according to Wettstein) provide a cue which
would contribute to determining that dog as the demonstratum.
For given the absence of any other obvious cues which might
enable the hearer to determine the identity of the intended
demonstratum, it is natural to suppose that the speaker is
indeed relying on the predicate to do so.
Given this rather wide range of semantically significant
cues,l" Wettstein has little trouble accounting for
demonstrative reference in the face of ostensive
indeterminacy. 'Ie is able to do so without having to invoke
speaker intentions: He simply invokes additional cues, which
serve to "disambiguate" the ostensive act. To see how this
might go, consider an utterance of "That is my dog,"
accompanied by an ostensive gesture in the direction of one of
among several equally salient canines. The question is: How is
it that the demonstrated dog, and rinot, e.g., his coat, gets
secured as the demonstratum of the token occurrence of "that'"?
After all,, in pointing to the dog, the speaker cannot but
point to his coat as well. Furthermore, there is not, in this
particular case, any common noun, attaching to the
demonstrative, to assist in the disambiguation. According to
Wettstein, the dog (and not his coat) gets secured as the
demonstratum, because of the semantic significance of the
predicate "is my dog." Since the predicate indicates that the
speaker is speaking about the dog, and not, e.g., about the
dog's coat, and since the absence of other helpful cues (apart
from the indeterminate ostension) suggests that the speaker is
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indeed relying on that provided by the predicate, the
predicate is what fixes the dog (as opposed to, e.g., his
coat) as the demonstratum.
So much for exegesis. Now let's look at what reasons there
might be for favoring such a view. Perhaps the most obvious
attraction of a contextual view like Wettstein's, is that -
unlike the intentional view - it appears to have no difficulty
accommodating cases where a wayward demonstration overrides a
conflicting intention. Consider the Carnap/Agnew scenario
described above. A straightforward application of the
intentional view would yield the counter-intuitive claim that
when Kaplan Lttered "Dthat is a picture of one of the greatest
philosophers of the twentieth century," while pointing at the
picture of Agnew, he actually said something about the picture
of Carnap (the intended demonstratum). A straightforward
application of Wettstein's contextual view, on the other hand,
would appear to yield the desired result: Kaplan said
something about the picture of Agnew - the object indicated by
the relevant cues - the most obvious of which was the pointing
gesture. A less obvious, though no less significant cue, would
be the predicate "is a picture..." For the predicate would
serve to "disambiguate" the pointing gesture; to make it the
case that the picture (of Agnew) and not (e.g.) the picture
frame, or the glass protecting the picture, emerges as the
demonst r atum.
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Aside from its ability to handle these rather complex cases,
are there any other reasons for favoring a contextual account
like Wettstein's? Well, in the absence of any counter-
examples, such a view would be rendered superior to a quasi-
intentional view on account of its greater simplicity. After
all, if all cases of demonstrative reference can be explained
solely in terms of certain publicly accessible cues, then why
complicate the picture? Why suppose that intentions interact
with such cues to determine demonstrative reference?
However, it is not difficult to find counter-examples to
Wettstein's view, as it is not difficult to come up with cases
where the actual demonstratum is the intended demonstratum -
though not the object or individual indicated by the relevant
cues. The most compelling cases of this sort occur in
situations where the predicate - one of the cues "exploited"
by the speaker - leads the hearer to misidentify the intended
demonstratum. Consider a scenario involving two equally
salient canines: Fid.j and Spot. And suppose that the speaker
mistakes Spot for Fido. (Perhaps the two dogs look quite
similar at a distance.) Suppose further that the speaker says
to the addressee (Fido's owner, who can recognize her dog at
any distance): "That's your dog Fido," intending to say
something of the dog mistaken for Fido. Finally, suppose that
no more than a vague nod in the general direction of the two
canines accompanies the demonstrative utterance. (It would be
natural to assume, then, that the speaker is relying, in large
13
part, on the predicate, "is your dog Fido," to convey the
identity of the intended demonstratum.) Intuitively, the
utterance was false, as the speaker seems quite clearly to
have said falsely of Spot that he was the addressee's dog
Fido. Yet Wettstein's view would have it that the utterance
was true. For Wettstein's view would havF it that Fido was the
demonstratum of the demonstrative expression occurring in the
utterance in question. After all, Fido - and not Spot - was
the dog indicated by the relevant cues (which included, most
notably, the predicate "is your dog Fido"). And so again,
Wettstein's view predicts that the utterance in question was
actually true. But that just doesn't seem right. The intuition
that the utterance was false seems too strong to allow for
such a possibility.
There are a number of ways in which someone favoring an
approach like Wettstein's might respond to the foregoing.
First, one might simply dismiss cases of the sort in question
- cases where there is a divergence between the intended
demonstratum and the entity indicated by the relevant cues -
as "abnormal." One might further point out that the theory
appears to have no difficulties handling the "normal" cases -
cases where the intended demonstratum and the entity indicated
by the relevant cues, converge. One might accordingly argue
that the proponent of the contextual view has a right to
dismiss (as potential data) the intuitions surrounding the
"abnormal" cases, and to then legislate: to stipulate that, in
cases of the sort in question, the entity indicated by the
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relevant cues is indeed the demonstratum - despite what the
intuitions surrounding such cases might appear to suggest. 1
Second, one might attempt to account for the intuitions
surrounding the cases in question by invoking Kripke's
speaker's reference/semantic reference distinction. Consider
the Spot/Fido scenario described above. One might argue that,
while it is certainly true that the speaker referred to Spot,
and said of Spot, that he was the addressee's dog Fido, the
semantic referent of "that," in the speaker's utterance of
"That's your dog Fido," was in fact Fido. That the speaker
referred to and said something false of Spot, is what
generates the mistaken intuition that the actual utterance was
false.
A third, more radical response, would involve modifying the
contextual view by excluding the predicate as a semantic
determinant. In this way, one would simply be eliminating the
especially embarrassing cases by making appropriate changes in
the theory. Were this sort of approach adopted, one could then
say that, in the Spot/Fido scenario, the speaker's failure to
convey the identity of the intended demonstratum by means of
the appropriate cues (which would include an ostensive act as
well as an appropriate demonstrative description) resulted in
his failure to say anything determinate. The intuition that
something determinate (and false) was in fact said, could then
be accounted for by appealing, once again, to the speaker's
reference/semantic reference distinction. Though there was no
15
semantic referent (the demonstrative was vacuous), there was a
speaker's referent - an individual who was falsely claimed to
be Fido.
One difficulty with the first of the three proposals is that,
by excluding the "abnormal" cases (cases where the intended
demonstratum and the entity indicated by the relevant cues,
diverge), the theory's range of application is significantly
narrowed. The theory would have to be restated as (something
like); In the "normal" cases (cases where there is a
convergence between the intended demonstratum and the entity
indicated by the relevant cues), the actual demonstratum will
be the entity indicated by the relevant cues. One problem with
this restricted version of the theory, is that it has the
effect of robbing that theory of any advantage it might have
had over the intentional theory. For the latter theory can
also, by excluding certain "abnormal" cases (like the
Carnap/Agnew case), account for all of the "normal" ones.
Further, by excluding cases of the sort in question, the
contextualist thereby excludes the Carnap/Agnew case - a case
which appears to provide considerable evidence for his theory.
More importantly, the cases excluded by the restricted version
of the contextual theory- the "abnormal" ones, are the
natural test cases for that theory (as well as for the
intentional theory). For they represent cases where the
intended demonstratum and the object or individual indicated
by the relevant cues, diverge. In such cases, intuitions about
which7 (if either) of these two entities is the actual
16
demonstratum, will constitute crucial data that both "all or
nothing" views must somehow manage to accommodate. Thus, for
the proponent of either "all or nothing" view to simply
disregard the intuitions in question - on the grounds that the
cases that generate them are "abnormal" - would be ad hoc.
Hence, neither proponent is in any position to legislate here:
to declare by fiat that the "abnormal" cases are to be
analyzed in accordance with the theory in question - despite
the intuitions surrounding such cases.1
The second proposal suggested above doesn't look much more
promising. The difficulty here is that intuitions go directly
against making the distinction in a way favorable to the
Wettsteinian picture. Consider the utterance (described above)
of "That's your dog Fido," where the demonstrative is used by
the speaker to "pick out" a particular dog who, unbeknownst t.,
the speaker, is not Fido, but his look-alike companion Spot.
Spot, surely, is the speaker's referent - there's no doubt
about that. This fact would indeed account for the intuition
that something false seems to have been said; for the speaker
referred to Spot, and said falsely of Spot, that he was the
addressee's dog Fido. But to suppose that the semantic
referent of the demonstrative was actually Fido, would be to
suppose that, when the speaker uttered, "That's your dog
Fido," what he said was - strictly speaking - true. But surely
the intuitions go the other way here; surely the intuition is
that, strictly speaking, the speaker's utterance was false.
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And such intuitions would suggest that, the semantic referent
- not just the speaker's referent - was Spot.1-
The third proposal faces difficulties as well. By excluding
the predicate from the class of semantically significant cues,
the proponent of the contextual view is going to wind up with
countless cases of referential indeterminacy - where
intuitively, there is none. For often, when one utters a
sentence of the form "That is such-and-such," or "This is
such-and-such," one is relying largely on the predicate to
convey the identity of the intended demonstratum. If the
predicate is not a semantic determinant, then the
contextualist is going to have a difficult time accounting for
the fact that determinate reference does seem to be achieved
in many such cases. Consider utterances of sentences like
"That's a nice tie" or "This is such a humid day." Surely, it
is possible for the demonstrative expressions occurring in
such utterances to achieve determinate reference. But it is
hard to see just how the contextualist can account for this
without appealing to the cue provided by the predicate.A-' To
attempt to account for this apparent referential determinacy
in terms of speaker's reference (as suggested above) would be
implausible. For uttelrances of the sort in question
(utterances of sentences like "That's nice tie") are surely
capable of expressing determinate propositions. But that would
not be possible if the demonstratives in such utterances were
without semantic referents.
18
(b) The Intentional View
So much for the contextual view of demonstrative reference.
Now let's turn to the intentional view. The central idea
behind any view of the sort that I have been describing as
"intentional," is that the demonstratum of a demonstrative
expression is determined entirely by the speaker's intention
to demonstrate, and say something of, a particular object or
individual. (This entity is sometimes described as the entity
that the speaker - in somr intuitive, unanalyzed, sense - "has
in mind". 2 ') According to any such view, if the speaker
intends to demonstrate, and say something of x, then ipso,
facto, x is the demonstratum - even if y is the object
indicated by certain publicly accessible "cues."
Kaplan, Donnellan, and Bertolet," 2 all appear 'to adhere to
something like this view. Bertolet, however, seems to want to
restrict his remarks about demonstratives to speaker's
reference, and Donnellan (apparently) has expressed his views
on demonstratives only in personal correspondence (and not
with the author of this paper). I will therefore direct my
remarks in this section toward Kaplan's particular version of
the intentional view.
Kaplan's recently adopted intentional view, which he discusses
rather briefly in "Afterthoughts" (Kaplan, 1989), purports to
account for the reference of a particular class of
demonstratives - "perceptual demonstratives." Perceptual
demonstratives are demonstratives employed in situations where
19
the intended demonstratum is a perceived object or individual
on which the speaker has "focused." The demonstratum of such
an expression is determined by what Kaplan refers to as the
"directing intention": the intention of the speaker to
demonstrate, and say something of, the "perceived" object or
individual on which he has "focused." If (e.g.) the spe;-ker
utters "That is Fido," while harboring such an intention with
respect to a particular dog (a perceived dog on which he has
"focused'), then - and only then - will that dog emerge as the
demonstratum of the demonstrative expression occurring in that
utterance. The intention is said to be a "directing" one,
presumably because it is thought to direct - in some
teleological sense - the forthcoming act of demonstration. But
the act of demonstration itself is entirely without semantic
significance. Its only significance is pragmatic, its sole
function being the facilitation of communication. Kaplan sums
up his view as follows:
I am now inclined to regard the directing intention, at
least in the case of perceptual demonstratives, as
criterial, and to regard the demonstration as a mere
externralizatior, of this inner intention. The external-
ization is an aid to communication, like speaking
more slowly and loudly, but is of no semantic
significance. (Kaplan, 1989, p. 582)
One of the most obvious attractions of a view like Kaplan's,
is that it provides a rather convincing analysis of those
cases which prove problematic for a contextual view like
Wettstein's. With respect to the Spot/Fido scenario described
above, the intentional view predicts what seems intuitively
20
clear: the utterance of "That's your dog Fido" was false on
the grounds that the speaker said falsely of Spot that he was
the addressee's dog Fido. Moreover, this prediction is based
on the intuitively plausible claim that the demonstrative
expression had Spot and not Fido as its demonstratum, because
it was the former and not the latter that the speaker intended
to speak of.
Apart from these particular advantages, are there any other
reasons to favor the intentional view? In the absence of
difficult cases, the intentional view would be preferable to
the quasi-intentional view, on the grounds of its greater
simplicity. There are, however, troubling cases for the
intentional view. In particular, Kaplan's view appears to give
an incorrect analysis of cases where the speaker's intention
is overruled by a wayward demonstration. As we saw above, a
straightforward application of the intentional view to the
Carnap/Agnew scenario, yields the counter-intuitive claim that
Kaplan said something about the picture of Carnap - and not
about that of Agnew.
However, in fairness to Kaplan, it ought to be pointed out
that his theory of "perceptual demonstratives" does not
purport to account for cases like the Carnap/Agnew case. For
in that case, the intended demonstratum (the picture of
Carnap) is not a "perceived" object or individurl, on which the
speaker has "focused." Moreover, in a footnote, Kaplan
describes the Carnap/Agnew case as "complex and atypical", as
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it surely is. For surely in the "simple and typical" cases,
one does perceive the object or individual that one
demonstrates. Neither of these factors, however, is of much
help to Kaplan. First, it is not difficult to come up with
cases which Kaplan's theory does purport to account for, but
cannot. Second, although the Carnap/Agnew case is indeed
"complex, and atypical," it does provide evidence for those
competing theories of demonstrative reference which are able
to accommodate it. Kaplan's theory thus loses some
plausibility on account of its comparatively narrow range of
application.
Let's take these two points in turn, beginning with the first.
The particular counter-examples to Kaplan's view that I have
in mind, have been discussed by me at length elsewhere.73 I
will therefore be brief. Consider the following scenario. You
realize that you have left your keys on a colleague's desk.
You return to her office, and spot your keys on her desk
(which happen to be alongside her keys). And then, while
making a grab for your keys (on which you have "focused"), you
come out with an utterance of "These are mine." However, when
you look at the keys in your hand, you see that they are not
yours - but your colleague's. Though you perceived arnd
"focused" on your keys - the keys which you intended to
demonstrate, and say something of - your demonstration was
slightly off-target, resulting in the unexpected acquisition
of your' colleague's keys.
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Kaplan's "directing intention" view predicts that what you
have said is true; for you said truly of your keys (the
intended demonstrata) that they were your keys. However,
surely your utterance was false - on the grounds that you said
falsely of your colleague's keys that they were yours. And
surely your colleague would not have been out of line, had she
responded to your assertion with an utterance of, "No, you're
wrong. Those keys belong to me." But if Kaplan's view were
correct, then such a response would have indicated that the
speaker simply hadn't understood what you actually said (on
account of your slightly off-target demonstration). And on
Kaplan's view, it would have been appropriate for you to
rejoin, while returning your colleague's keys, with an
utterance of: "Yes, these are your keys, but I never said they
were mine.
What cases like the foregoing seem very clearly to show, is
that, contrary to Kaplan's "directing intention" view,
ostensive gestures - at least in certain cases - are capable
of overriding conflicting intentions. Such gestures would thus
appear to be semantically significant. The semantic
significance of ostensive gestures is also borne out by the
Carnap/Agnew case. Again, it is true that this particular case
does not, strictly speaking, constitute a counter"-example to
Kaplan's view - as the intended demonstratum is not a
perceived object or individual on which the speaker has
"focused." But it clearly does cast doubt on a central idea
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underpinning Kaplan's "directing intention" view - that
ostensive gestures are entirely without semantic significance.
Moreover, the fact that such gestures are sometimes
semantically significant, when coupled with verbal
demonstratives, surely tends to support the view that they are
always, or at least generally, semantically significant, when
coupled with such expressions. This brings us to the second of
the two points raised above. Because the contextual and quasi-
intentional views attribute semantic significance to oastensive
gestures, they ought to have no difficulty accommodating cases
of the sort in question: cases where it seems clear that such
gestures do indeed contribute to the determination of the
demonstratum. Their greater range of application thus gives
them a clear advantage over the "directing intention" view of
Kaplan.
Finally, because cases of the sort in question represent cases
where there is a divergence between the intended demonstratum
and the object or individual indicated by certain publicly
accessible "cues," they constitute natural test cases for a
view like Kaplan's - a view, according to which it is the
intention, and not the "cues," that determines the reference
of a demonstrative. Rather than being relegated to a footnote
(where they are dismissed as "comple:x: and atypical"), cases of
this sort should receive especially close attention by the
intentional ist.
(c) The Qluasi-Intentional View of "Dthat"
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At this point, it would appear that the only plausible view of
demonstrative reference would be a quasi-intentional one: one
according to which intentions play a limited role in
determining demonstrata. For there appear to be cases where it
is necessary to appeal to intentions in order to explain
demonstrative reference - and yet there also appear to be
cases where intentions are simply not sufficient (and perhaps
not even necessary) to explain such reference. The natural
(and logical) conclusion to draw is that a quasi-intentional
view of demonstrative reference (of the sort proposed in
"Dthat") is not unlikely to be a correct view of such
reference.
However, despite its apparent ability to handle certain cases
which prove difficult for the "all or nothing" views, the view
proposed in "Dthat" is not without its problems. In fact, it
is not all that clear that the view is equipped to deal
adequately with cases where a wayward demonstration overrides
a conflicting intention. Specifically, it is not clear that
the view is able to account for the fact that, in such cases,
a determinate proposition may be expressed. The determinacy of
the proposition expressed poses a problem for the view in
question, as it appears to be at odds with Kaplan's remarks
(in "Dthat' ") about the indeterminacy of ostension. Because
ostension is (according to Kaplan) invariably indeterminate,
an intention is needed to disambiguate any act of ostension.J4
(For this reason, Kaplan is led to the view that intentions do
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play some role in demonstrative reference.) But if the
intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the picture of
Carnap is overruled by the accompanying demonstration, it will
presumably not figure in the determination of the
demonstratum. But in that case, what intention (if any) serves
to disambiguate the demonstration: to make it the case that it
is a pointing at the picture of Agnew - and not, e.g., a
pointing at the picture frame, the glass protecting the
picture, a section of the picture, etc.? More generally, in
cases of the sort in question - cases where the intended and
actual demonstratum appear to diverge - what intention (if
any) will serve to disambiguate the accompanying
demonstration?
If the quasi-intentional view is to be considered a plausible
theory of demonstrative reference, it must provide some way of
dealing with this problem.
3. A Modified Quasi-Intentional View
There are several ways in which the proponent of a quasi-
intentional view might respond to the foregoing. First, he
might deny (contra K::apliin's position in "Dthat") that a
determinate proposition is in fact enpressed in cases where a
wayward demonstration appears to override a conflicting
intention. He might do so on the grounds that the
demonstration remains ambiguous, due to the absence of an
appropriate disambiguating intention. One would then need to
account for the intuition that a determinate proposition was
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in fact expressed - that proposition being (in the
Carnap/Agnew case) that a certain picture of Agnew was a
picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth
century. Such an account could perhaps be provided by
appealing to the fact that, in interpreting an utterance,
there is a natural inclination to assume that conditions are
"normal". In the case in question, this would involve assuming
that Kaplan was aware of the fact that the picture he was
pointing at was one of Agnew, and that he therefore had an
appropriae' "disambiguating" intention - an intention to
demonstrate, and say something of, the picture of Agnew.2= The
general view would then be that, in cases of the sort in
question, there is no actual demonstratum - as there is no
intention available to disambiguate the demonstration, thus
securing a demonstratum.
Alternatively, one might argue that, in cases of the sort in
question, a determinate proposition is in fact expressed. But
one might go on to deny that the speaker's intentions have
anythi'.' to do with what that proposition is. Specifically,
one mis, claim that, in cases where the appropriate
disambiguating intention is absent, the demonstratum is
determined entirely by publicly accessible "cues" of the sort
discussed by Wettstein. The determinate proposition exp•resied
would then coincide with whatever proposition the attentive
and linguistically competent hearer would take to have been
expressed. With respect to the Carnap/Agnew case, the
proposition expressed would be one to the effect that a
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certain picture of Agnew pictured one of the greatest
philosophers of the twentieth century. (And this, of course,
is exactly the result one wants.) The basic idea would then be
that, when no disambiguating intention is available, the
contextual "cues" exploited by the speaker take on the entire
burden of determining reference.
The main drawback of the first of these two proposals, is that
it relies on external ex:.planatory mechanisms to "explain away"
intuitions contrary to what the theory itself would lead one
to expect. The main drawback of the second proposal, is that
it fails to unify those cases of demonstrative reference
involving ostension. For it claims that intentions come into
play only in the "normal" cases - cases where the speaker's
intention is capable of disambiguating his demonstration. From
the point of view of the theorist who is able to provide a
unified account of demonstrative reference which accommodates
cases of the sort in question without the assistance of
external explanatory devices, both of the foregoing analyses
would appear ad hoc.
There is, fortunately, just such an account: one which suffers
from neither of the problems infecting the other two accounts.
According to this third and, to my mind, more plausible
analysis, Kaplan's pointing gesture is indeed disambiguated by
one of his intentions - contrary to what might initially
appear to be the case. This intention is not, however, the
"primary" one: it is not the intention to demonstrate, and say
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something of, the picture of Carnap. Rather, it is a
"secondary" intention: an intention to demonstrate, and say
something of, the picture in the general direction of the
gesture - a picture which (unbeknownst to Kaplan) is not the
picture of Carnap. This intention is a "secondary" one, as it
is derivative, being the natural outcome of conjoining the
"primary" intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the
picture of Carnap with the (mistaken) de dicto belief that the
picture in the direction of the gesture, is that very picture.
On this view, the picture of Agnew - and not the picture
frame, the glass protecting the picture, etc. - gets secured
as the demonstratum, because the secondary intention concerns
the picture (in the range of the gesture) - and not any of
those other things. The idea, more generally, would be as
follows. In cases where the intended and actual demonstratum
diverge, the demonstration is indeed disambiguated by an
accompanying intention - only this intention will not be the
"primary" one. Rather, it will be a "secondary" intention (to
demonstrate the F in the direction of the demonstration) which
results from conjoining the primary intention with certain
belief(s) the speaker has about the object of the latter
intention. (As we'll see below, the relevant beliefs will be
those which connect the object of the primary intention, with
the demonstrative act.)
The foregoing notions of "primary" and "secondary ' " intentions
can be spelled out a bit more as follows. Associated with any
demonstrative uitterance will be a singular proposition
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(representing a certain de re belief) which the speaker
intends to communicate by means of that utterance, and which
is such that its successful communication will result in the
speaker's commtunicating precisely what he intends to
communicate. When the demonstrative utterance is accompanied
by an ostensive act, there will be an accompanying intention
to demonstrate the "constituent" of the singular proposition.
The intention to demonstrate this individual, and to predicate
something of it (thereby expressing a singular proposition),
is what I mean by the "primary" intention. Thus, consider the
Carnap/Agnew case. Here, the primary intention would be the
intention to demonstrate a certain picture of Carnap, and to
say of that picture that it is a picture of one of the
greatest philosophers of the twentieth century."2
Now the author of a demonstrative utterance will ordinarily
have a host of beliefs concerning the object of his primary
intention; the "constituent" of the singular proposition he
intends to communicate. Certain of these beliefs will play a
crucial semantic role in cases where the intended and actual
demonstratum diverge. The relevant beliefs will be those which
connect the intended demonstratum (the object of the primary
intention) with the demonstrative act. In the Carnap/Agnew
case, the relevant belief would be Kaplan's (de dicto) belief
that the picture in the direction of the gesture is x: the
intended demonstratum - the particular picture of Carnap he
"has in mind." When conjoined with Kaplan's primary intention
- the result is a secondary intention: an intention to
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demonstrate, and say something of the picture in the direction
of the gesture. And this intention amounts (more concisely) to
an intention to express a singular proposition of the form "x
is a picture...," where "x" is instantiated by the picture in
the direction of the demonstration - which, unbeknownst to
Kaplan, happens to be a certain picture of Agnew. Eecause this
secondary intention is predicated on Kaplan's mistaken belief
that the picture pointed to is the picture he "has in mind,"
communication of the intended (secondary) proposition, will
not result in Kaplan's communicating precisely what he
intended to communicate. In fact, there is no reason to
suppose that Kaplan even has the de re belief which the
(secondary) proposition would ordinarily be taken to express:
the belief that x is a picture of one of the greatest
philosophers of the twentieth century, where "x" is
instantiated by the picture of Agnew pointed to. (Contrast the
foregoing with the case of Kaplan's primary intention, where
communication of the intended proposition - which has a
certain picture of Carnap as a "constituent" - would result in
Kaplan's communicating precisely what he intended to
communicate.)
Kaplan's belief that the picture of Carnap - the picture he
"has in mind" - is one and the same as the picture in whose
direction he is gesturing, seems quite likely to be relevant
to demonstrative reference. For its conjunction with Kaplan's
primary intention, yields a secondary intention, which is able
to do the job of disambiguating Kaplan's pointing gesture. In
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this way, a demonstratum - the picture of Agnew - gets
secured. And this, of course, accords with our intuition that
a demonstratum is indeed secured, and that the demonstratum is
a certain picture of Agnew. It further accords with the more
specific intuition that the picture of Agnew gets secured as
the demonstratum, because Kaplan intended to demonstrate the
picture in the direction of his gesture - a picture which he
failed to renlize was not the object of his primary intention
- the picture he "had in mind."
It is important to note that the secondary (disambiguating)
intention needn't be the result of conjoining the primary
intention with a de dict., bhelief about "the F in the range of
the demonstration." The belief conjoined with the primary
intention, is sometimes a de re belief about that F. To see
this, suppose that Kaplan was looking where he was pointing,
but wasn't looking carefully. Suppose further that he mistook
the (perceived) picture of Agnew for the object of his primary
intention: a certain picture of Carnap. In such a case, it
would seem that the (secondary) disambiguating intention - the
intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the picture in
the range of the demonstration - would be the result of
conjoining the primary intention with the de re belief,
concerning the picture in the range of the demonstration, that
it is the picture of Carnap that Kaplan "has in mind." In
fact, it would seem that in all cases where the demonstratum
is perceived by the speaker, the secondary (disambiguating)
intention will be formed from conjoining the primary intention
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with a de re belief about "the F in the range of the
demonstration." (The perception of that entity would enable
the speaker to form a de re belief about it.) Only in cases
where the demonstratum is not perceived by the speaker, will
the srcondary (disambiguating) intention be derived from the
conjunction of the primary intention and de dicto beliefs
about "the F in the range of the demonstration." After all, in
such cases, there would ordinarily be no reason to suspect
that the speaker even has a de re belief, concerning the F in
the range of the demonstration, that it is the F he has in
mind. In the original Carnap/Agnew scenario, for instance,
there seems no reason to suppose that Kaplan has a de re
belief, concerning the picture in the range of the
demonstration, that it is the picture he "has in mind." For
this reason, it is natural to suppose that - in the original
Carnap/Agnew scenario - the disambiguating intention is formed
from a de dicto belief about "the picture in the range of the
demonstration."
Such considerations suggest the following generalization
concerning the particular class of "abnormal" cases in
question: cases where the intended and actual demonstratum
diverge. In cases where the speaker has a de re belief which
would yield a disambiguating intention when conjoined with the
primary intention, that is how the disambiguating intention
will be derived. Only in cases where no such de re belief is
available, will a de dicto belief conjoin with the primary
intention to form the disambiguating intention. Such
considerations in turn suggest the following generalization.
With respect to the class of cases where there is a divergence
between the intended and actual demonstratum, the "normal"
cases will be those in which the disambiguating intention is
formed from a de re belief about "the F in the range of the
demonstration." For it appears as though de dicto beliefs
concerning "the F in the range of the demonstration" come into
play only when no de re belief about that F is available.
Not only does the proposed quasi-intentional view account for
these "abnormal" cases, it accounts equally well for the
"normal" cases; cases where the intended and actual
demonstratum converge. Let's look briefly at cases of the
latter sort - which were discussed in some detail in the
opening section of this paper. In the scenarios described in
that section, the speaker accompanied her utterance of "That
is Fido," with an ostensive gesture in the direction of the
intended demonstratum: a particular dog. It seemed plausible
to suppose that the speaker's intention to demonstrate the dog
(in the direction of the gesture) disambiguated her
demonstration, thus securing that dog as the demonstratum. And
this analysis is, of course, in perfectly in line with the
proposed view. For in the case in question, the disambiguating
intention will be an intention to demonstrate the dog in the
(general) direction of the gesture. In this particular case,
however, the disambiguating intention would be the primary
one: the intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the
dog the speaker "has in mind" (Fido). For in the "normal"
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cases - cases where the particular F the speaker "has in mind"
is in fac:t the F in the range of the demonstration, the
primary intention will suffice to disambiguate the
demonstration. There will accordingly be no need to invoke
secondary intentions.
It should be clear that the view sketched above is really
nothing more than an elaboration of the view proposed by
Kaplan in "Dthat." In that essay, Kaplan suggested that the
demonstrata of token demonstratives2 7 (which were accompanied
by demonstrations) were determined partly by the
demonstrations, and partly by speaker intentions. The general
idea seemed to be that the demonstrations would narrow the
range of possible demonstrata, and the intentions would then
"disambiguate" the demonstrations, thereby narrowing the range
to just one. In this way, a demonstratum was determined. What
the proposed view adds to Kaplan's view, is a characterization
of the disambiguating intentions. It starts off by
acknowledging the existence of a plurality of intentions
(primary and secondary) associated with any demonstrative
utterance accompanied by an ostensive gesture. It then singles
out the disambiguating intention: the intention to
demonstrate, and say something of the particular F in the
general direction of the demonstration. In this way, one is
able to account for the fact that there can be a divergence
between the intended demonstratum- the object of one's
primary intention - and the actual demonstratum. In such
cases, the demonstration is, as usual, disambiguated by an
intention to demonstrate and say something of the F in the
general range of the demonstration. Only this intention will
not be the primary intention - but a secondary intention,
which arises from the conjunction of the primary intention,
with certain (false) beliefs concerning the object of the
latter intention. Only by acknowledging the existence of
intentions other than the primary one, is the proponent of the
quasi-intentional view able to adequately account for what
happens when the actual and intended demonstratum diverge.
In concluding this discussion of the quasi-intentional view of
demonstrative reference, I would like to address two
objections that have recently been levelled against it.2" One
of these objections is indirect, as it purports to be a
defense of the intentional view. The defense runs as follows.
Whenever contextual cues (demonstrations, in particular)
appear to override the speaker's intention, the conflict is
not actually between the former and the latter; rather, it is
between various intentions ascribable to the speaker. In the
Carnap/Agnew case, the conflict is between the intention to
refer to Carnap's picture, and the intention to refer to the
picture in the range of the demonstration (which, unbeknownst
to Kaplan, is a certain picture of Agnew). The contextual cues
play a significant role in determining the reference only to
the extent that they are backed by some intention. Thus,
without the intention to refer to the picture in the range of
the demonstration, Kaplan's pointing to that picture would
have been without semantic significance. That is, it would not
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have contributed to securing the picture of Agnew as the
demonstratum.
The second objection is more direct, casting doubt on the
proposed analysis by claiming that one of the central cases
motivating it - the Carnap/Agnew case - is "derivative." The
author of this objection argues as follows. Normally, the
speaker would have a perception of the demonstratum. In the
Carnap/Agnew case, this would of course be the picture of
Agnew. But this condition is not present in that particular
case. What then does this do to the example? Doesn't it make
the example derivative from the normal case where the
demonstratum is perceived (by the speaker)? And so wouldn't it
be plausible to suppose that the perception's content plays a
role in determining demonstrative reference - and that any
other mental states of the speaker are in fact semantically
irrelevant? After all, when the speaker sees the picture -
which is what happens in the "normal" case - he simply intends
to demonstrate what he sees.
Let me begin with the first of these two objections. My main
concern with this purported defense of the intentional view,
is that it strikes me as more of a defense of a quasi-
intentional view. After all, the former view states that
"contextual cues" are of pragmatic significance only, while
the author of the objection in question admits that such cues
have semantic significance - though only if they are backed by
some intention.
3,7
In fact, I am inclined to agree with the view in question.
That is, I agree that when it appears as though contextual
cues override the speaker's intention, this does in general
reflect a conflict between various intentions of the speaker,
Let's look at the Carnap/Agnew case again. Here, contextual
cues (specifically, a pointing gesture) do appear to override
Kaplan's primary (though not secondary) intention; his
intention to demonstrate, and say something of, a certain
picture of Carnap. And this does indeed reflect a conflict
between intentions of Kaplan's: between his primary intention,
and the disambiguating intention - the intention to
demonstrate, and say something of, the picture in the range of
the demonstration. For Kaplan's "wayward" pointing gesture
does indeed reflect his intention to refer to the picture in
the range of the demonstration - a picture which is not
(unbeknownst to Kaplan) the object of his primary intention.
Moreover, I tend to agree that the pointing gesture would not
be of semantic significance, unless it were backed by an
intention. In fact, it seems clear that an outstretched arm,
with index finger extended, would not even be a
"demonstration" unless it were intended as a such; as a means
of drawing the hearer's attention to some object/individual.
(Without such an intention, the "gesture" would simply be an
outstretched arm, with index finger extended.) Further,
whenever there is such an intention: an intention to employ
some gesture as a demonstration, there will also be a (more
specific) intention to demonstrate some particular
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object/individual. But none of this shows that contextual cues
are semantically irrelevant - as the intentionalist claims.
All that it shows is that such cues are semantically relevant
only in so far as they are accompanied by certain
intentions."' And again, this is a view with which I agree.
Let me now turn to the second of the two objections. My
response to this objection is three-fold. First, while it is
certainly true that in the majority of cases involving a
demonstrative act, the demonstratum is perceived by the
speaker, this does not mean that perception has anything to do
with the necessary and sufficient conditions for demonstrative
reference.zO Indeed, I would have thought that the
Carnap/Agnew case clearly showed that the speaker's perception
of some entity is not a necessary condition for that entity to
emerge as the demonstratum. Moreover, it is easy to see the
speaker's perception of an entity is likewise not a sufficient
condition for that entity's emerging as the demonstratum.
Suppose that while Kaplan was pointing to the picture behind
him, he ias staring at a picture in front of him. Clearly,
that would not mean that the perceived picture was the
demonstratum.
Second, there is a serious problenm with any view of
demonstrative reference which claims that, in the "normal"
cases, the demonstratum - intended and actual - will simply be
the entity perceived. For there is a sort of indeterminacy
which infects perception as much as it does ostension.
39
Consider an utterance of "That is a beautiful coat" where the
intended demonstratum is Fido's freshly washed coat. Suppose
that the speaker is currently perceiving the coat in question
- and that the case is therefore a "normal" one. Well, in that
case, the speaker is also perceiving Fido, parts of Fido
(e.g., his tail), parts of the coat in question, etc. Now what
makes it the case that the coat - and not any of those other
perceived things - gets secured as the demonstratum? The
proponert of the perceptual view in question would seem to be
at a loss here. For what the considerations in question show,
is that perceptual content, by itself, is not sufficient to
"determine" an individual, and is therefore not sufficient to
determine a demonstratum. And surely, a plausible alternative
to the perceptual view, would be the view that the speaker's
intention to point to the coat is a determining factor: a
factor which "conspires" with the gesture in Fido's direction
to determine a demonstratum: Fido's coat. Whether or not
Fido's coat is being perceived by the speaker at the time of
the utterance, would seem to be semantically irrelevant.
Third, while the Carnap/Agnew case is indeed "abnormal", this
really does nothing to undercut the proposed view. For one of
the chief advantages of that view is that it accommodates all
of the cases - "normal" (where the demonstratum is perce~ .ved)
as well as "abnormal" (where the demonstratum is not
perceived). For in both sorts of cases, there will be an
intention to demonstrate, and say something of, the particular
F in the range of one's gesture. And this intention can then
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be invoked to account for the fact that in both sorts of
cases, an entity may be secured as the demonstratum, despite
the indeterminacy of ostension. In contrast, the perceptual
view under consideration will, at best, account only for the
securing of demonstrata in the "normal" cases - cases where
the demonstratum is perceived. And yet the natural test cases
for that view would, of course, be the "abnormal" ones: those
in which the demonstratum was not perceived.
4. Concluding Remarks
In light of the foregoing, the general conclusion to draw
seems clear: Whatever the details of the correct theory of
demonstrative reference turn out to be, that theory will be a
quasi-intentional one: one which attributes a limited role to
intentions in the determination of demonstrata.
A more specific conclusion can be drawn as well: In certain
cases, speaker intentions will play the role of
"disambiguating" demonstrations, thereby securing demonstrata.
This was, of course, the view sketched toward the end of
"Dthat". However, the ways in which intentions "conspire" withi
demonstrations to determine demonstrata, appear to be more
subtle and complex than suggested in "Dthat." For in order to
account for referential determinacy in cases where the
intended and actual demonstratum diverge, it appears necessary
to invoke what I have referred to as "secondary" intentions:
intentions derived from conjoining the "primary" intention,
with certain beliefs the speaker has about the object of that
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intention. In such cases, the secondary intention will do the
work of disambiguating the demonstration.
The cases motivating the proposed quasi-intentional view
primarily involved scenarios where the demonstrative utterance
contained a demonstrative pronoun, and was accompanied by an
ostensive gesture. For it is cases of this particular sort
that seem to best bring out the plausibility of the view that
intentions play a role - albeit a limited one - in
demonstrative reference. Little attention was given to cases
where the demonstrative expression was a demonstrative
description - like "that dog." Nor was much attention given to
cases where the demonstrative utterance was unaccompanied by
ostension. Clearly, any full-blown theory of demonstrative
reference will have to deal with such cases.`1 But whatever"
the correct analysis of such cases turns out to be, I think
that the considerations adduced in this paper show that the
analysis will have to cohere with a view that ascribes to
intentions a limited role in at least some cases of
demonstrative reference.
One final point. In light of the clear advantages that a
quasi-intentional view would seem to have over an "all or
nothing" type of view, one might wonder why the view proposed
in "Dthat" never gained favor. One possible explanation for
this has to do with the way in which philosophers seem to
approach the problem of demonstrative reference. Often, it
seems, philosophers approach the problem armed with a certain
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ideology: a certain picture of what they suppose language to
be. (Wettstein is explicit in taking this approach.) The data
are then interpreted in accordance with this picture.
Wittgensteinian-minded philosophers (such as Wettstein) are
going to view "what is said" (by way of a demonstrative
utterance) as, roughly, what the speaker would normally be
interpreted as having said. In contrast, Gricean-minded
philosophers are going to view "what is said" as, roughly,
what the speaker intends to say (communicate). With these two
simplistic pictures of language looming in the background, it
is not difficult to predict the views of demonstrative
reference that will emerge. The Wittgensteinians will develop
a contextual view; the Griceans, an intentional view.
If, instead, one left one's ideologies aside, and focused on
the pre-theoretical intuitions surrounding the natural test
cases for the "all or nothing" views: cases involving a
divergence between the intended demonstratum and the entity
indicated by the relevant "cues," one might begin to
appreciate the plausibility of the quasi-intentional view.32
NOTES
I By "demonstratum," I mean the semantic referent of an
expression traditionally classified as a demonstrative. I take
such expressions to include "this," "that," their plural
forms, as well as expressions of the form "this F," and "that
F," together with their plural forms. The semantic referent of
such an expression can be thought of as (roughly) the object
or individual whose properties are relevant to the truth
conditions (and value) of the utterance in which the
demonstrative expression occurs. In an intuitive, pre-
theoretical sense, the demonstratum is the object or
individual which the demonstrative utterance is "about."
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" By "intended demonstratumL,," I mean the object or individual
about which the speaker intends to say something, by means of
a demonstrative utterance: an utterance containing a
demonstrative expression. When the demonstrative utterance is
accompanied by a demonstration, the intended demonstratum will
be the object or individual the speaker intends to
demonstrate, and say something of. However, as will become
clear in section 3, the notion of "intended demonstratum" is
ambiguous; for associated with any one demonstrative act, is a
plurality of speaker intentions.
• "Dthat" is Kaplan's word for the demonstrative use of
"that." An expression is used "demonstratively," according to
Kaplan, "when the speaker intends that the object for which
the phrase stands be designated by an associated
demonstration." (Kaplan, 1979, p. 389)
4 Although I follow Kaplan here in speaking of intentions as
"disambiguating" demonstrations, I think there is some
inaccuracy in this way of speaking. I think it would be more
accurate to say that, until intentions are brought into the
picture, the demonstratum remains "ambiguous" or
"indeterminate", on account of the fact that the accompanying
demonstration cannot, by itself, "pick out" a unique object or
individual. By invoking intentions, one is able to
"disambiguate" or "determine" the demonstratum.
: Kaplan might have wished to have added a proviso specifying
that the demonstrative expression be a demonstrative pronoun -
like "this" or "that," as opposed to a demonstrative
description - like "this cat" or "that dog." For where the
demonstrative expression is a demonstrative description, it is
not implausible to suppose that, at least in some such cases,
the common noun might effect the desired "disambiguation". An
appeal to intentions might not be required in such cases.
6 From the speaker's point of view, all that is pointed to is
the intended demonstratum.
7 So far as I am aware, Donnellar, has expressed his views on
demonstrative reference only in personal correspondence -
with, e.g., Howard Wettstein.
a The locution is Kaplan's. #
' Both McGinn and Wettstein are highly critical of other non-
intentional theories of demonstrative reference - including
those which make such reference dependent on causal relations
obtaining between the speaker and the demonstratum. These
particular theories will not be discussed in this paper, as
the criticisms of McGinn and Wettstein strike the author as
decisive. For details, see McGinn (1981) and Wettstein (1984).
1o In those cases where no demonstration accompanies an
utterarnce of "...that F...," due to there being just one F "in
the immediate environment" (which would render astension
otiose), McGinn claims that "the location of the speaker's
body is what serves as the para-linguistic determinant" of the
demonstratum. (McGinn, 1981, p. 183) So far as I can make
sense of this remark, it strikes me as obviously false.
Suppose that my dog Fido has just been viciously attacked by
my neighbor 's dog Spot. The neighbor has just removed his ill-
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behaved dog from the premises. I then say to my addressee,
"That dog is the worst behaved dog that I have ever seen."
Surely the fact that Fido is the only canine in the "immediate
environment" is not going to make him the demonstratum of
"that dog," as that expression occurred in my utterance. And
surely the fact that Spot is by this time several hundred feet
away, is not going to prevent him from emerging as the
demonstratum. And yet that is precisely what McGinn's view
would seem to predict.
"i For Wettstein, the relevant "public" is restricted to the
audi ence.
s2 My inclination would be to treat ostensive gestures as
cues of this sort. For the verbal demonstrative, when coupled
with a demonstration - a contex:.tual feature - indicates to the
hearer that the intended demonstratum is the object or
individual designated by the gesture. For a similar view, see
J.I. Biro: 1982, "Intention, Demonstration, and Reference",
Philosophy and Phenomernological Research, Vol. XLIII, no. 1,
pp. 35-41.
13 McGinn does not discuss the problem of ostensive
indeterminacy in "The Mechanism of Reference." However, based
on certain remarks made in personal correspondence with
Wettstein (Wettstein, 1984, pp. 76-77) it is not difficult to
predict what McGinn would say about this problem. McGinn,
apparently, regards demonstrative pronouns like "this" and
"that" as elliptical for demonstrative descriptions of the
form "this F" or "that F." Thus, with respect to an utterance
of "That is Fido," accompanied by a pointing gesture in the
direction of a particular dog, McGinn would presumably say
that the tacit common noun (presumably "dog") effects the
"disambiguation": that is, makes it the case that the
utterance is about the dog and not, e.g., about his coat. For
some persuasive criticisms of the view that demonstrative
pronouns abbreviate demonstrative descriptions, see Wettstein
(1984) pp. 76-78.
14 Wettstein offers a number of compelling objections to
McGinn's view in the final section of his paper. One
objection, not mentioned by Wettstein, concerns the rather
obvious fact that McGinn's view is applicable only in cases
where the demonstratum is perceived (if at all) visually. How
would McGinn deal with utterances of sentences like "That
smell is awful," or "That noise is driving me crazy"? Where
the demonstratum is perceived otherwise than visually,
ostension is (at least generally) inappropriate, and McGinn's
view is thus inapplicable. It would be of no use to claim
that, in such cases, the location of the speaker's body will
serve as the "para-linguistic determinant" of the
demonstratum. For it is not clear that it makes any sense to
specify exact locations of things like smells and sounds.
Moreover, none of the views of demonstrative reference
criticized by McGinn (including the "classical description
theory" and the "causal-genetic theory") face this particular
difficulty. Nor does the view of Wettstein, nor do the
intentional/quasi-intentional views of Kaplan.
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2' For another version of the same basic view, see Charles
Travis' The Uses o"f Sense (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1989). Travis argues in favor of a contextual view, using as a
criterion "what a reasonable judge would say". For another
hearer-oriented theory of reference, see Relevance, by Dan
Sperber and Deidre Wilson (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986).
1 The range is even wider, according to Wettstein, who
discusses other cues not discussed in this paper. Certain of
these cues - described by Wettstein as "extra-contextual" -
have to do with previous speaker/addressee encounters. Such
cues are nevertheless "contextual" in the sense defined in
section 2: accessible to the public - and, in particular, to
the audience. For details, see Wettstein (1984) pp. 71-72.
17 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
Is I take for granted here, and throughout the paper, the
importance of pre-theoretical intuitions in determining "what
is said". For an interesting discussion of this point, see
Francois Recanati: 1989, "The Pragmatics of What is Said,"
Hind & Language, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 295-329. See especially
his discussion of the "Availability Principle".
19 Contrast the utterance of "That's your dog Fido," with an
utterance of "Her husband is kind to her," where the speaker's
referent in the latter case is the woman's kind lover - to
whom she has been driven by her husband's cruelty. (The
example is from Linsky.) In the latter case, there is a strong
intuition to the effect that - strictly speaking - the
utterance was false, though the speaker referred to, and said
truly of the lover, that he was kind to the woman. But in the
former case, there is no similarly strong intuition to the
effect that - strictly speaking - the utterance was true
(though the speaker said falsely of Spot that he was the
addressee's dog Fido). Kripke's application of the speaker's
referent/semantic referent distinction to the kind lover/cruel
husband case, receives its plausibility largely from
intuitions concerning what is "strictly speaking" said. Eut
these same intuitions, when applied to the Spot/Fido case,
support the view - contrary to the Wettsteinian picture - that
both the speaker's and semantic referent was Spot. For in that
case, the intuition is surely that - strictly speaking - the
utterance was false.
20 With respect to an utterance (unaccompanied by ostension)
of, e.g., "That's a nice tie," McGinn would presumably say
that the demonstrative pronoun "that" abbreviates some
demonstrative description - e.g. "that tie," .nd that the
demonstratum of the latter will be whatever tie stands in the
appropriate spatio-temporal relations to the speaker's body.
For Wettstein's criticisms of this view, see Wettstein (1984)
pp. 76-78.
21 See, for instance, Kaplan's remarks on the intended
demonstratum in Kaplan (1979) p. 395.
22 For Eertolet's views see his (1980) "Demonstratives and
Intentions," Philosophical Studies 36, pp. 75-78. For
Bertolet's responses to criticisms of the views expressed in
46
that paper, see his (1986-1987) "Referring, Demonstrating, and
Intending," Philosophy Research Archives, pp. 251-260.
2" "Demonstratives, Demonstrations, and Demonstrata"
(forthcoming in Philosophical Studies); "Do Demonstrations
Have Semantic Significance?" (forthcoming in Analysis);
"Demonstrating with Descriptions" (forthcoming in Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research).
24 At least in those cases where the demonstrative expression
is a demonstrative pronoun like "this" or "that" - as opposed
to a demonstrative description like "this cat" or "that dog."
"m It's not clear that this account would do the job. For even
after being apprised of the fact that conditions were not
"normal": that Kaplan's intentions concerned a picture which
was other than where he thought, the intuition that a
determinate proposition was expressed (one concerning the
picture of Agnew) remains.
2 Wettstein draws a somewhat similar distinction between
primary and non-primary "havings in mind." See Wettstein
(1984) pp. 70-71 for details.
27 More precisely, token demonstrative pronouns.
2S Both of these objections were provided by anonymous
reviewers.
2e I am thus in disagreement with Wettstein here, who wants to
claim that - even without any sort of intention to back it
an outstretched arm might have semantic significance. See
Wettstein (1984) p. 72.
"O For compelling arguments in favor of the view that the
speaker's perception of the demonstratum is semantically
irrelevant, see McGinn (1981) pp. 160-163.
m1 Any such theory would also have to deal with the phenomenon
of "deferred ostension." In cases of this sort, one object is
demonstrated as a means of securing the reference of some
other object - where the latter, in contrast to the former, is
(typically) not in the perceptual field. What makes such a
process possible is the existence of some uniquely
identifiable relation obtaining between the demonstrated
object and what I have called the "demonstratum" - the
semantic referent of the demonstrative expression. For
instance, consider a scenario where the speaker, pointing at a
book, says "She's great." In such a case, it is possible that
the speaker is demonstrating the book as a way of referring to
its author. (The uniquely identifiable relation obtaining
between the bootk and its author, is the relation that males
the deferred ostension possible here.)
It is not difficult to see that this phenomenon coheres well
with the proposed quasi-intentional view of demonstrative
reference. Consider the case just mentioned. What makes the
book the demonstrated object is the gesture - which is in the
direction of the book - in conjunction with the speaker's
intention to demonstrate the book (as opposed to, e.g., the
book's jacket). Because the demonstratum will be determined in
part by what the demonstrated object is, it will likewise be
determined (in part) by the gesture, in conjunction with a
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disambiguating intention. (And of course, the securing of the
author as the demonstratum will depend as well upon the
speaker's intention to demonstrate the book as a means of
indirectly demonstrating its author - as opposed to, e.g., its
publisher.) For an interesting discussion of deferred
ostension, see section IV of Geoffrey Nunberg's (1979) "The
Non-Uniqueness of Semantic Solutions," Linguistics and
Philosophy 3, pp. 143-184.
3 I would like to thank- two anonymous Syn these reviewers for
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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THE MAXIMAL SALIENCE THEORY OF DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS
Those who oppose the position I have expressed must hold
that it is possible to be correct in identifying, as the
referent of an expression whose referent is
conventionally underdetermined, an object other than the
object the speaker intended to refer to. Yet it must be
acknowledged that the only question the hearer can
intelligently ask himself in attempting to disambiguate
the reference is 'Which one does the speaker intend?'
Gareth Evans (1982)
1. Preliminaries
It has been over a dozen years since the maximal salience
theory of definite descriptions was first proposed. According
this theory, adumbrated in David Lewis' 1973 Courterfactuals,;
and subsequently developed by both Lewis 2 and James McCawley, "
an occurrence of the F" denotes the most salient of the F's
in the domain of discourse. A (token) sentence of the form
"'The F is G'0 will thus come out true just in case the most
salient F (in the domain of discourse) is G. So far as I klnow,
there has been no published response to this theory. I find
this lack of response especially surprising in view of the
recent trend toward Russellian (quantificational) approaches
to definite descriptions. 4 For the maximal salience theory of
definite descriptions was developed in response to a
particular problem thought to be intractable for any
Russe.lian approach to such expressions.
I would like to open up the way for discussion of the ma:.;imal
salience theory (MST) by looking carefully and critically at
that theory - and, in particular, at the version of the theory
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shared by Lewis and McCawley.0 My discussion of the theory
falls into eight sections. In section 2, I lay out the
background of the theory, by discussing the particular problem
it was designed to avoid. In section 3, I present and
illustrate the theory, and in section 4, I say a few words on
its behalf, and attempt to defend it against a recent
objection.* (The objection is that the theory blatantly
conflates the pragmatic/semantic distinction, and is thus
without any initial plausibility.) In section 5, I go on to
discuss what I take to be genuine difficulties with MST. And
then in section 6, I present Lewis' recently modified version
of MST 7 - which was designed to accommodate the difficulties
discussed in section 5. In section 7, I draw attention to
various problems with Lewis' revised version of MST and then
in section 8, I discuss some possible responses to these
difficulties. And finally, in section 9, I conclude with a few
brief arguments for the claim that, whatever the correct
semantic account of definite descriptions turns out to be,
that account will most probably assign a significant role to
referential intentions.a
2. Background
Consider the following two sentences:
(1) The dog isn't barking, but some other dog is.
(2) The dog got into a fight with another dog.
As Lewis and McCawley have pointed out," occurrences of
sentences like (1) and (2) could be trute. Such sentences would
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thus appear to constitute counter-examples to Russell's theory
of descriptions. For according the latter, sentences of the
form "The F is G" are to be analyzed as (roughly): "There is
exactly one F and whatever is F is G." Thus, on Russell's
theory, the analysis of either sentence would be
contradictory, affirming both that there is exactly one dog,
and that there is another dog as well. Yet it is difficult to
see how the occurrence of some sentence receiving a
contradictory analysis, could be true. 10
It might initially be supposed that the problem at hand could
be dealt with simply by assuming that "the dog" in an
occurrence of a sentence like (1) or (2) was elliptical for
some "complete" description (a description that uniquely
denotes). In that case, a Russellian analysis of the
"completed" sentence would not be contradictory, and would
thus be consistent with the possibility that occurrences of
such sentences might be true. Suppose, for instance, that "the
dog" in an occurrence of (1) or (2) was taken as elliptical
for (the uniquely denoting) "the dog now staring at me." In
that case, the Russellian expansions of the (completed)
sentences would affirm that there was exactly one dog now
staring at me, and another dog as well. The contradiction thus
vanishes; the (token) sentences might therefore be true.
But such a move is simply not available to the Russellian. For
as has been argued convincingly by Howard Wettstein,i there
are often numerous possible ways of completing an "incomplete"
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definite description (a description which fails to uniquely
denote), with no principled way of adjudicating between them.
How, for instance, is one to choose between descriptions like
"the dog now staring at me" and "the dog now living at 15
Lawrence Street" - if the two descriptions are co-denoting
(both denoting the intended dog)? It would be of no use to
argue that any one of the possible completions would do the
job - so long as it uniquely described the intended
object/individual. For a different completion would of course
yield a different sentence - and hence a different Russellian
analysis. - But that is at odds with the intuition that
sentences like (1) and (2) above are capable of expressing
determinate "propositions." For if (individual) occurrences of
such sentences do indeed express determinate propositions,
they can have but one (Russellian) analysis.
One might initially suppose that one need only ask the speaker
which completion (of the numerous possible completions) he has
in mind. But suppose (as is surely possible) that the speaker
simply has no particular completion in mind. This would
suggest that there is perhaps no prircipled way of determining
the "correct" completion of an incomplete description, and
thus no principled way of determining the "correct" Russellian
analysis of the sentence containing that description. The
problem for the Russellian thus remains: In analyzing
sentences containing incomplete descriptions (descriptions
like "the dog") how is one to choose from among (non-
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equivalent) co-denoting descriptions like "the dog now staring
at me" and "the dog now living at 15 Lawrence Street"?
It has recently been suggested by Stephen Neale 13 that the
problem of adjudicating between non-equivalent7 co-denating
descriptions, can be solved simply by supposing that the
"correct" description will result from completing the
incomplete description with purely nonr-descriptive (i.e.,
referential or indexical) material. Wettstein's criticism is
flawed, according to Neale, because he assumes that the
incomplete description must be completed with descriptive
mater i al.
By way of illustration, Neale offers several examples of
incomplete descriptions completed with non-descriptive
material. Following Soames,"4 he points out that completing an
incomplete description with referential material is natural
for descriptions like "the mayor" or "the murderer," "where an
additional argument place can be made available for a
particular individual specified by the context of the
utterance." " Neale accordingly suggests that the foregaoing be
completed as: "the mayor of a"/"the murderer of b," where "a"
and "b" are referring expressions - either ordinary names
(like "Guilford" or "Smith") or demonstratives (like "this
town" or "this man"). Since the material used to complete the
descriptions is referential, rather than descriptive, the
individuals themselves (rather than certain "concepts") enter
into the proposition expressed by the sentence uttered. Thus,
while a particular occur-rence of "the mayor," might be
completed as (e.g.) either "the mayor of Guilford" or "the
mayor of this town," that does riot actually mean that there is
more than one possible completion to choose from. For both
expressions pick out the same town - which enters into the
proposition expressed - and thus contribute precisely the same
semantic content to that proposition. There is thus no real
chcice to be made: the two descriptions are in effect
equivalent. *
But now consider a description like "the table," as it occurs
in an utterance of a sentence like "The table is covered with
books." Neale admits that with respect to such descriptions
"there is no natural argument position to be made
avaiiable."' 7 He then suggests that these descriptions be
completed with indexical material sensitive to the "contextual
coordinates" of the utterance. A completion of "the table"
sensitive to the spatial coordinate of a particular utterance
of "The table is covered with books," might yield "the table
over there" or "the table over here." In such a case, the
actual location of the table would enter into the proposition
expressed by the utterance in question.
Neale apparently believes that by stipulating tlhat incomplete
descriptions be completed with purely norn-descriptive
material, one avoids "the problem raised by nonequivalent
codenoting descriptions." The assumption appears to be that by
adhering to such a stipulation, the number of possible
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completions of an incomplete description will (in effect) be
narrowed down to just one. In this way, the problem of having
to choose from among a host of possible completions is
eliminated.
There are two major problems with Neale's proposed solution to
the problem of adjudicating between non-equivalent, co-
denoting descriptions. To begin with, the proposal is
glaringly ad hoc. The only reason Neale provides for ruling
out completions containing descriptive material is that, by so
doing, the problem at hand dissolves. For again, Neale appears
to believe that, if the only completions allowed are those
containing referential/indexical material, there will in
effect be but one possible completion - and thus no choice to
be made. Now Neale is surely correct in thinking that the
Russellian who adopts the approach in question is "under no
obligation to treat the ellipsed material as free of referring
expressions and indexicals." •I One cannot, after all, simply
declare that the ellipsed material must be descriptive in
nature. But neither can the Russellian simply declare that the
ellipsed material must be referential/indexical in nature. But
that is precisely what Neale appears to do.
Neale might respond by arguing that completions containing
purely referential/indexical material are more intuitively
plausible than completions containing descriptive material. He
might accordingly argue that he is not actually stipulating
that the completions be non-descriptive in nature. Rather, he
is drawing attention to the fact that such completions are
more natural than descriptive ones, and hence more likely to
be "correct."
It may indeed be the case that referential/indexical
completions are occasionally more natural than descriptive
ones, but it is easy to see that they are not always more
natural. Consider the following scenario. You're taking an
afternoon drive with a friend, when a dog appears on the road
from out of nowhere. You hit the dog, and subsequently take
him/her to the local vet. Later in the day you get a call from
the vet, who informs you that the dog is going to be all
right. You then call your friend and say "The dog is going to
be OK,." Surely a natural way of completing the description
would be as "the dog I hit this afterroon." Though this
completion contains referential and indexical elements, it is
not entirely description-free, as demanded by Neale's account.
(There is a descriptive element in the verb "hit.") Moreover,
there seems to be no natural way of completing the description
with purely referential/indexical elements. Thus, Neale's
proposal that the completions of incomplete descriptions
contain description-free material does indeed seem to be ad
hcoc. For in at least some cases, the most natural completions
do contain at least swme descriptive material. To give one
more example, consider a scenario where you and a friend are
looking at "Most Wanted" posters in the post office. Suppose
that there are three such posters: one featuring a murderer,
one a thief, and one an arsonist. You say to your friend, "The
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murderer looks like Dilligan." A natural way of completing the
description would be as: "The murderer inr the picture over
there." Again, while this completion contains some
referential/indexical elements, it is also partly descriptive
(in its reference to "the picture"). But it is surely no less
natural than (e.g.) "the murderer over there," where the
indexical expression picks out the location of the picture.
And so again, it looks as though Neale's proposal that
incomplete descriptions be completed with description-free
material is indeed ad hoc.
A second, and far more serious, difficulty with Neale's
proposal is that it simply will not do the job that it is
designed to do. For it is not difficult to see that, even if
completions of incomplete descriptions are stipulated to be
non-descriptive, the problem of adjudicating between non-
equivalent, co-denoting descriptions remains. To see this,
consider a Donnellian courtroom scenario involving Jones - on
trial for murdering Smith. Suppose further that Jones is in
fact guilty as charged. And final Iy, suppose that someone in
the courtroom, observing Jones' outrageous behavior on the
witness stand, comes out with an utterance of "The murderer is
insane." There are at least two ways of completing the
description with purely referential/indexical material -
neither of which seems any more plausible than the other.
There is: "the murderer of Jonres," where the referential
expressian ("Jones") picks out Jones; and there is "the
murderer over there," where the indexical expression ("over
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there") picks out the location of the murderer. Neale's
proposed ad ho.c solution to the problem of adjudicating
between non-equivalent, co-denoting descriptions, thus fails.
For while these two descriptions are in fact co-denoting, they
are nror-equivalerit as well: their semantic contribution to the
proposition expressed would be different. One would contribute
the murder victim - the other, the location of the murderer.
But Neale, unfortunately, does not tell us how to choose
between such non-equivalent (albeit co-denoting) descriptions.
Ironically, by introducing the possibility of completing
incomplete descriptions with purely referential/indexical
material, Neale shows that the problem facing the Russellian
is perhaps even more daunting than previously thought. For not
only are there descriptive completions to choose from - there
are (purely) referential/indexical ones to choose from as
well.
The problem for the Russellian thus remains: How is one to
account for the apparent fact that occurrences of sentences
like (1) and (2) above could be true?",
3. The Theory
(a) An Alternative to Russell's Theory
In response to the problem posed by sentences like (3) and (2)
above - sentences which, though intuitively non-contradictory
- have Russellian expansions which are contradictory, Lewis
and McCawley have proposed a "maximal salience" theory of
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definite descriptions. Because Lewis' presentation of the
theory is more thorough than McCawley's, the focus here will
be on the former. According to Lewis (who formulates the
theory in terms of toaken sentences) an occurrence of "the F'1
denotes some object/individual x "if and only if x is the most
salient F in the domain of discourse, according to some
contex;tually determined salience ranking."2' An occurrence of
"The F is G" will thus be true just in case the most salient F
(in the domain of discourse) is G. Thus, on the view in
question, a particular occurrence of (1) would be true just in
case the most salient dog was not barking, while some other
less salient dog was. Similarly, a particular occurrence of
(2) would be true just in case the most salient dog got into a
fight with some other less salient dog. Since such scenarios
are easily imaginable, Lewis' theory accounts for the
intuition that occurrences of sentences like (1) and (2) could
be true. That theory would thus appear to be one up on
Russell's theory of descriptions, which assigns to such
sentences a contradictory analysis.2 •
(b) Salience
The central notion here is, of course, the notion of
"salience." Although neither Lewis nor McCawiey ever give a
precise characterization of this notion, Lewis does offer a
number of isolated comments on the matter. It is in "General
Semantics"2 2 that the notion (described there as "prominence")
is first mentioned in connection with definite descriptions.
There, Lewis writes:
...consider the sentence 'The door is open'. This does
not mean corntra Russell) that the one and only door that
now exists is open; nor does it mean that the one and
only door near the place of utterance, pointed at, or
mentioned in previous discourse, is open. Rather it means
that the one and only door among the objects that are
somehow prominent on the occasion is open. An object may
be prominent because it is nearby, or pointed at, or
mentioned; but none of this is a necessary condition of
contextual prominence. ;3
(Lewis later came to realize that an utterance of "The F is G"
might be appropriate even in contexts where there was more
than one "prominent" F. This led him to adopt the view that
such an utterance meant that there was a moot salient/
prominent F that was G.)
Later, in Counterlfactuals, we get a more psychological
characterization of the notion of "salience":
When i is a thing with a point of view - say a person or
an animal - then some things are more salient than others
from the point of view of i. They loom larger in his
mental life; they are more important to him; they come
more readily to the center of his attention. Right now,
as I sit writing this, my typewriter is more salient to
me than my left shoe; tnat is more salient than the
k~Itchen clock in the house where I grew up; that is more
salient than the fourteenth brick from the right in the
seventh row from the top in the garden wall outside my
window; but all of these things are salient to me to some
extent, in contrast to the countless things that are
outside my ken altogether. (I am speaking of how salient
these things were before I started to think up examples
of things that were not very salient...) 2 4
And finally, in "Scorekeeping in a Language Game,""2 we get a
brief description of the sorts of conditions that are capable
of bringing about shifts in salience. Lewis writes:
There are various ways for something to gain salience.
Some have to do with the course of conversation, others
do not. Imagine yourself with me as I write these words.
In the room is a cat, Brtuce, who has been making himself
very salient by dashing madly about. He is the only cat
in the room, or in sight, or in earshot. I start to speakl
to you:
The cat is in the carton. The cat will never meet our
other cat, because our other cat lives in New Zealand.
Our New Zealand cat lives with the Cresswells. And there
he'll stay, because Miriam would be sad if the cat went
away.
At first, "the cat" denotes Bruce, he being the most
salient cat for reasons having nothing to do with the
course of conversation. If I want to talk about Albert,
our New Zealand cat, I have to say "our other cat" or
"our New Zealand cat." But as I talk more and more about
Albert, and not any more about Bruce, I raise Albert's
salience by conversational means. Finally, in the last
sentence of my monologue, I am in a position to say "the
cat" and thereby denote not Bruce but rather the newly-
most-salient cat Albert. 2
Lewis goes on to point out (in "Scorekeeping") that the
salience of a particular object/individual may be raised by
means of a sentence containing an irdefirite description. He
writes;
I may say "'A cat is on the lawn" under circumstances in
which it is apparent to all parties that there is some
one particular cat that is responsible for the truth of
what I say, and for my saying it...What I said was an
ex;istential quantification; hence, strictly speaking, it
involves no reference to any particular cat.
Nevertheless, it raises the salience of the cat that made
me say it. Hence, this newly-maost-salient cat may be
denoted by E"the cat") in subsequent dialogue..."7
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Although Lewis' characterization of "salience" is not as
precise as it might be (we are never given anything like
necessary and sufficient conditions), enough is said to enable
us to set up scenarios where a certain F is quite clearly the
"most salient" F in the domain of discourse. And that is
sufficient for the primary purpose of this paper, which is to
show that MST will simply not work as a semantic theory of
definite descriptions; that (more specifically) it will be
necessary to invoke referential in tentions, .
(c) A "Rule of Accommodation"
After spelling out his theory of definite descriptions (in
"Scorekeeping"), Lewis goes on to discuss a certain "rule"
which, he claims, "governs the kinematics of salience." This
so-called "rule of accommodation for comparative salience" is
formulated as follows:
If at time t something is said that requires, if it is to
be acceptable Etrue, non-trivial, warranted, etc.] that x
be more salient than y; and if, just before t, x is no
more salient than y; then - ceteris paribus and within
certain limits - at t, x becomes more salient than y.26
We then get a few illustrations of the rule:
Suppose my monologue has left Albert more salient than
Bruce; but the next thing I say is "The cat is going to
pounce on you!" If Albert remains the most salient cat,
then what I say is patently false: Albert cannot pounce
all the way from New Zealand to Princeton. What I have
said requires for its acceptability that "the cat" denote
Bruce, and hence that Bruce be once again more salient
than Albert. If what I say requires that, then
straightaway it is so. By saying what I did, I have made
Bruce more salient than Albert. If next I say, "The cat
prefe;-s moist food," that is true if Bruce prefers moist
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food, even if Albert doesn't...The same thing would
happen if instead I had said "The cat is out of the
carton" or "The cat has gone upstairs." Again what I say
is unacceptable unless the salience ranking shifts so
that Bruce rises above Albert, and hence so that "the
cat" once gain denotes Bruce. The difference is in the
type of unacceptability that would ensue without the
shift. It is trivially true and hence not worth saying
that Albert is out of the carton...,It may be true or it
may be false that Albert has gone upstairs in the
Cresswell's house in New Zealand. But I have no way of
knowing, so I have no business saying that he has.E 7
It is important to note that Lewis does not claim that the
rule of accommodation comes into play wheriever the presumed
acceptability of some (token) sentence requires that a certain
F (other than that most salient just before t) be the
denotation of "the F." For the rule claims that salience will
shift in the manner described, "ceteris paribus and within
certain limits." Lewis, unfortunately, does not spell out the
significance of this clause. However, it is not difficult to
imagine the sorts of exceptions that he might have in mind
here. Sometimes what we actually irntend to say (to
communicate) is "unacceptable" in Lewis' sense of that
locution: false, trivial, and/or unwarranted. Oftentimes, we
are not aware of the unacceptability of what we intend to say;
though sometimes (no doubt) we are. In such cases - cases
where what we intend to say is "unacceptable" - it seems quite
plausible to suppose that Lewis' rule does not operate.
Consider, for instance, the following scenario. Lewis' friend
Bob is in a room with Lewis' two cats - Bruce and Albert.
Bruce, having recently been the topic of conversation, is the
most salient cat just before t - at which time (t) Bob comes
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out with an utterance of "The cat spends most of his time in
New Zealand." Suppose that the rule of accommodation comes
into play here. That would presumably mean that Albert would
become the most salient cat at t - and hence the denotation of
"the cat," as that expression occurs in Bob's utterance. For
the acceptability - in particular, the truth - of the sentence
uttered, would require that Albert (and not Bruce) be the
denotation of the description (and hence the most salient cat
at t). But suppose that Bob intended to refer to Bruce - the
cat most salient just before t - and to say of Bruce that he
spends most of his time in New Zealand. Having such intentions
is surely possible, for it is surely possible that Bob has
confused the two cats - believing that Albert is the
"Princeton cat" and Bruce the "New Zealand cat." (And then, of
course, there is the possibility that Bob is simply lying.) In
such a case, it would seem clear that the sentence uttered
would be false - and false on the grounds that Bruce does not
spend most of his time in New Zealand.
Thus, perhaps the "ceteris paribus and within certain limits"
clause is to be interpreted along the following lines. The
rule in question comes into play, provided that the internded F
and the F raised to salience in accordance with the rule,
con, verge. Given this proviso, Lewis could then grant that "the
cat" in Bob's utterance of "The cat spends most of his time in
New Zealand," might in fact denote Bruce - the intended cat.
This woulN then enable Lewis to account for the intuition that
the sentence uttered was false because Bruce sperids most of
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his time in Princeton (not New Zealand) - and not true because
Albert spends most of his time in New Zealand.
(d) Forecasting Difficulties for MST
If the foregoing does in fact represent Lewis' rationale
behind including the proviso in question, difficulties
immediately arise for MST. For if, on certain occasions,
intentions appear to come into play in determining reference,
it is natural to suppose that they might come into play on
(other occasions as well. For instance, consider cases where
the intended F and the F specified by Lewis' rule of
accommodation, converge. Recall the example in which Lewis
(while in Princeton) says "The cat is going to pounce on you!"
in the midst of a monologue which has left Albert - the New
Zealand cat - maximally salient. Lewis suggests, plausibly,
that the sentence will be true on the grounds that Bruce (the
denotation of the description) is about to pounce on the
addressee. Now how exactly is it that Bruce gets secured as
the denotation? Lewis suggests that Bruce emerges as the
denotation, as he has become (in accordance with the rule in
question) the most salient cat at t. However, it is surely not
implausible to suppose that Bruce is the denotation because he
is the cat that the speaker intended to denote by means of the
description. This view receives further plausibility from the
fact that in certain cases (just discussed) where the z,,tended
F and the F most salient according to the rule (sarns proviso)
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diverge, it is the forrmer that apparently emerges as the
denotation of the description.
Such considerations might naturally lead to the following line
of thought. If referential intentions play a semantic role in
cases where Lewis' rule is applicable, perhaps they play such
a role in cases where the rule is inapplicable. Specifically,
perhaps speaker intentions come into play in cases where the
presumed acceptability of the sentence uttered does not
require any sort of shifts in salience. The test cases for
this sort of view would of course involve cases where the
intended F and the F specified by MST, diverge. Below, I will
suggest that such test cases do indeed favor an intentional
view of definite descriptions over a maximal salience view of
the sort suggested by Lewis.
(e) Some Slight Modifications
Before saying anything more about MST, I would like to propose
two slight modifications of that theory (one ontological, one
terminological) - and then go on to focus on this modified
version.
Lewis talks of toaken sentences containing definite
descriptions: these are the entities to which he ascribes
truth conditions/values. He also talks in terms of
"denotation," • where the denotation of a definite description
is the entity whose properties are relevant to the truth value
of the taken sentence in which the description occurs. I would
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like to talk instead of (assertive) utterances and in terms of
(Kripkean) "semantic reference." Nothing crucial will hinge on
these modifications; though speaking of "semantic reference"
will enable me (later on) to make a natural contrast between
such reference and "speaker's reference."
My preference for talk of utterances (or of "what is literally
said") is purely aesthetic. To me, talking of utterances/what
is said, as being true or false, sounds more natural than
talking this way of (token) sentences.r o However, I regard the
truth conditions of a a particular utterance of "The F is G"
as being identical to those of that very token of the
sentence. Thus, nothing crucial will hinge on this change in
ontology. (If the alleged semantic identity fails to jibe with
the reader's intuitions, my notion of "utterance" may be
viewed as a technical one.) Additionally, I regard the
expressions "denotation" and "semantic referent" as
synr:onym7us: both designate the entity whose properties are
relevant to the truth value of the token sentence/utterance
containing a definite description. Thus, nothing crucial will
hinge on this change in terminology.
Accordingly, in what follows, when I refer to MST, I will be
referring to the view according to which the semantic referent
of an occurrence of "the F" is the most salient F in the
domain of discourse; and according to which an utterance of
"The F is G" will be true just in case the most salient F in
the domain of discourse is G.
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4. Motivating MST
From the point of view of the advocates of MST, one oF the
chief advantages of that theory is that it avoids a problem
that appears to be unavoidable for the Russellian. In
particular, it is able to account for the apparent fact that
utterances of sentences like (1) and (2) could be true;
(I) The dog is not barking, but some other dog is.
(2) The dog got into a fight with another dog.
(As argued above, the Russellian appears to be unable to
account for this fact.) MST is thus able to circumvent a
particular problem faced by what is perhaps the most widely
held theory of descriptions (at least among philosophers ) -
Russell's. Surely this fact alone provides some ground for
talk-ing MST seriously as a semantic theory of descriptions.
However, it has recently been claimed that, "as a s2mantic
account of definite descriptions," MST has no initial
plausibility. 3 2 The argument for this claim runs as follows:
... salience is relevant to pragmatics, not semantics.
This is because salience is a property that speakers
exploit to make themselves understood without being
explicit and which hearers exploit to understand
speakers, each doing so on the supposition that this is
what the other is trying to do. The phenomenon is 5not
specific to uses of definite descriptions or even to
reference, but...is quite general, indeed pervasive. That
is why MST as a semantic at:count of definite
descriptions, has no initial plausibility.
I agree with the foregoing in so far as I agree that salience
is indeed exploited in the manner suggested, and that it is
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therefore relevant to pragmatics. But the fact that salience
is exploited in this manner does not show it is irrelevant to
semantics. Specifically, the considerations in question do not
show that the salience of an entity has no bearing on whether
or not that entity emerges as the semantic referent (the
"denotation") of a referring expression (like a description,
name, or pronoun). In fact, I can think of at least one
philosopher (Howard Wettstein) who has argued persuasively and
at length, that the semantic referent of an indexical/
demonstrative expression will be the entity indicated by
certain publicly accessible "cues" exploited by the speaker in
an attempt to communicate about a certain object or
individual. In a end-note to "How to Bridge the Gap Between
Meaning and Reference,"-" Wettstein makes the plausible
suggestion that this view may well be on par with a salience
view of the sort developed by Lewis, where the entity
determined by the relevant "cues" is the most "salient" entity
relative to the utterance in which the referring expression
occu rs
Wettstein's salience view, like Lewis', may well be
mistaken. " 4 However, surely the latter (like the former) is
not without some initial plausibility. After all, it does
provide an intuitively plausible analysis of a certain class
of sentences that Russell's theory just doesn't seem to be
able to accommodate. Moreover, MST would surely be embraced by
many philosophers who buy into a Wittgensteinian view of
language, according to which language is properly regarded as
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a kind of social (and hence public) institution. And finally,
the case of definite descriptions seems rather different from
those of certain other so-called "referring" expressions -
like ordinary names and certain pronouns. For it seems
plausible to suppose that an expression of the form "the F"
has a certain "sense" - a sense which Russellians want to
claim involves uniqueness. Yet there seems to be no less
initial plausibility in the claim that the "sense" in question
involves - not uniqueness - but (maximal) salience.
5. Difficulties with MST
Despite its ability to circumvent a particular problem faced
by the Russellian approach to definite descriptions, MST faces
serious problems..: To get an idea of what some of these
problems are, consider the following two sentences.
(3) George plays bocce with the man every week.
(4) The plumber fixed the faucet this morning.
Consider, first, an utterance of (3). The problem here is that
it would seem as though George might be the most salient man
(in the domain of discourse) and yet not the (semantic)
referent of "the man." Suppose, for instance, that George, who
is currently engaged in a game of bocce with a (single) man
and several women, is the topic of conversation. Suppose
further that (3) is uttered in response to a query of "How
often does George play bocce with those people?" Now if George
is the most salient man, then in uttering (3), one would be
saying, accorcdng to MST, that George plays bocce with himself
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every week. And yet it would seem as though one could utter
(3) under the specified conditions, while saying something
entirely different, viz, that George plays bocce every week
with the man he's currently playing with. Indeed (under the
conditions described) , such would surely be the most natural
interpretation of the utterance.
Similar considerations would seem to hold with respect to an
utterance of (4). Suppose that the utterer of (4) is in fact a
plumber himself, who happens to be sharing a place with the
addressee and who, for rather vague "political" reasons,
refuses to do the house plumbing. Suppose further that the
house plumber is the bocci-playing George. It would seem then,
that the speaker might well be the most salient plumber (in
the domain of discourse) - and yet not the (semantic) referent
of "the plumber" - who is most plausibly the house plumber
George. It is quite possible, after all, that the speaker's
utterance was preceded by a brie- description of his day
making him the topic of conversation - and hence the most
salient of the plumbers in the domain of discourse. And
there's no reason to suppose that the house plumber (George)
has come up at all in conversation in the recent past.
Moreover, the speaker is right there in front of the
addressee, making himself salient by his speaking - whereas
George is nowhere in sight. Anrid yet surely when the speaker
comes out with an utterance of "The plumber fixed the faucet
this morning," he might well be making a claim about a plumber
other than himself, viz, about George.
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It might initially be supposed that the foregoing examples
could be handled by Lewis' "rule of accommodation for
comparative salience." So let's look at the two examples once
again, this time in light of Lewis' rule. Recall that the rule
in effect stipulates that shifts in salience take place on the
assumption that the utterance is "acceptable." Lewis claims
that three aspects of acceptability are: truth, non-
triviality, and warrantedness. But he acknowledges that there
may well be other aspects of acceptability. Bearing this in
mind, let's proceed to analyze the utterances in accordance
with Lewis' rule. Consider first an utterance of (3): "George
plays bocce with the man every week." Now one might argue
that, according to the rule in question, the presumed
acceptability of the utterance would prohibit George from
emerging as the referent of "the man." For any such reading of
the utterance would make that utterance unacceptable on
syntactic grounds. For syntactical rules (specifically,
Chomsky's "condition C"' '") prohibit "the man" (a referring
expression) from being bound by "George." Moreover, the
presumed truth and warrantedness of the utterance would
require that the man currently playing bocce with George be
the referent of "the man," and hence the most salient man.
(After all, it is presumably false that George plays bocce
with himself every week, though true that he plays with the
other man every week. And there is, moreover, presumably no
reason to suppose that the speaker has any grounds for
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supposing that things are otherwise.) In short, because the
presumed acceptability of the utterance requires that the man
playing bocce with George - and not George - be the referent
of "the man," that individual becomes (in accordance with
Lewis' rule) the most salient man, and hence the referent of
the description.
Now consider an utterance of (4): "The plumber fixed the
faucet this morning." One might attempt to employ Lewis' rule
here by arguing as follows. The presumed acceptability of the
utterance prohibits the speaker from being the referent of
"the plumber." For any such reading of the utterance would
render that utterance unacceptable an (broadly) pragmatic
grounds. For unless one is being arch, one ordinarily uses the
pronoun "I" to refer to oneself. Moreover, the presumed truth
and warrantedness of the utterance w:ould require that the
house plumber George be the referent of "the plumber" and
hence the most salient plumber. (I am assuming here that
George, the house plumber, did indeed fix the faucet on the
morning in question, and that the speaker knows this.) In
shtrt, because the presumed acceptability of the utterance
requires that George - and not the speaker - be the referent
of "the plumber," that individual becomes (in accordance with
Lewis' rule) the most salient plumber, and hence the referent
of the description.
Despite the initial plausibility of the foregoing analyses, it
seems to me that there is going to be a serious problem with
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any attempt to analyze examples like the foregoing in terms of
any sort of "rule of accommodation." And it seems to me,
moreover, that an attempt (such as the foregoing) to provide
such an analysis, points to a serious problem within MST
itself.
The basic problem here concerns the fact that Lewis' rule
purports to be one of "accommodation." The idea behind this
characterization is that "allowances" must be made for cases
where "the F" is used to refer to an F other than that most
salient just before t (t being the time of the utterance).
"Allowances" are thought to be required in such cases, because
"good conversational practice" requires that the speaker not
make things unnecessarily difficult for the audience. But by
using "the F" to refer to an F other than that most salient
just before t, the speaker might do just that. For in such
cases, the audience might need to do some "quick thinking" in
order to figure out which F was being referred to. (The
audience presumably does this by assuming that the utterance
is acceptable, and by then determining which F the description
would have to refer to, to ensure such acceptability.)
Ordinarily - that is, in cases where "the F" is being used
properly (cases where the speaker adheres to "good
conversational practice") there is no problem: the expression
refers to the most salient F just before (and hence at) t. And
so, in such cases, the attentive and linguistically competent
audience ought to have no trouble identifying the intended
referent.
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The problem with the foregoing approach - an approach which
underpins Lewis' rule - is that it is often bad conversational
practice to use "the F" to refer to the most salient F just
before t, and it is often good conversational practice to do
otherwise. To see this, consider again an utterance of
sentence (4) : "The plumber fixed the faucet this morning."
Suppose, as above, that the speaker (a plumber) does not
ordinarily do the house plumbing - a task undertaken by
George. Suppose further, that the speaker wishes to inform his
addressee that he (the speaker) fixed the faucet that morning.
Surely, it would (under the specified conditions) be bad
conversational practice to convey this bit of information via
an utterance of the sentence in question. For surely the
utterance would mislead the audience into believing that the
house plumber George fixed the faucet. (What the speaker ought
to have said, given such communicative intentions, was "I
fixed the faucet this morning.") Moreover, one could hardly
accuse the speaker of engaging in anything but the best of
conversational practices, were he to have uttered the sentence
in question as a way of conveying that the house plumber
(George) fixed the faucet that morning. But it is in the
former case - where the speaker uses the definite description
to refer to the plumber most salient just before t - that good
conversational practices are eschewed; and it is in the latter
case - where the speaker uses the definite description to
refer to some plumber who is rnot the most salient plumber just
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before t - that such practices are embraced. But to accept the
analysis of the latter use provided by Lewis' "rule of
accommodation," would, in effect, be to suppose that good
conversational practices are being eschewed in the latter
case.
What the preceding considerations suggest is that the proper
use of expressions of the form "the F" sometimes requires that
such expressions be used to refer to F's o.ther than those most
salient just before t. Doubt thus appears to be cast on MST,
according to which the reference of an expression of the form
in question is determined by maximal salience at t. For if
such an expression is in fact used prc(perly, there would be no
reason to suppose that "allowances" would have to be made in
order to ensure successful reference. But precisely such a
supposition is made by Lewis' "rule of accommodation," when
that rule is applied to utterances of the sort described
above. For these reasons, the proposed analyses of such
utterances in accordance with Lewis' "rule of accommodation,"
are implausible. There is thus no reason to suppose that the
reference of the descriptions occurring in those utterances is
secured via shifts in salience of the sort specified by Lewis'
rule."7 The problem for MST thus remains: How is that theory
to account for the reference of the descriptions occurring in
utterances of sentences like (3) and (4) above?
6. A Modified Version of MST
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In response to the difficulties posed by utterances of
sentences like (3) and (4) above, Lewis has suggested3 a the
following revised version of MST:
An expression of the form "the F" denotes the most
salient of the F's not most appropriately denoted in some
other way.
It is not difficult to see that the foregoing does indeed get
around the problems posed by utterances of the sort in
question. For instance, consider again an utterance of (3);
"George plays bocce with the man every week." As we saw, it
would be inappropriate to use "the man" to refer to George
here - though quite appropriate to use that expression to
refer to the man with whom George is currently playing bocce.
(Were the intention to say that George plays bocce with/by
himself every week - George would be most appropriately be
denoted via "himself.") And, in accordance with Lewis'
proposed revision, the man in question is quite plausibly the
most salient of the men (in the domain of discourse) not most
appropriately denoted in some other way. For in the scenario
envisioned, there are just two men playing bocce: George and
the other man.
Similar considerations would seem to hold with respect to an
utterance of sentence (4); "The plumber fixed the faucet this
morning." As we saw, it would be inappropriate for the speaker
to use the description to refer to himself. (He would have
been most appropriately denoted via "I.") Yet it would be
perfectly appropriate to use the description to refer to the
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plumber who usually does the house plumbing - George. And it
is surely plausible to suppose that George is the most salient
of the plumbers (in the domain of discourse) not most
appropriately denoted in some other way.
There is another advantage that accrues to Lewis' modified
version of MST. This modified version is able to accommodate a
phenomenon that Lewis refers to obliquely (and
parenthetically) in "Scorekeeping." After spelling out and
illustrating his version of MST, Lewis writes;
...I shall ignore the possibility that something might be
highly salient in one of its guises, but less salient in
another. Possibly we really need to appeal to a salience
ranking not of individuals but rather of individuals-in-
gui ses...
Lewis has since explained just what sorts of cases he had in
mind here."" He had in mind "secret-identity" cases. As an
example (provided by Lewis), consider the case of Superman -
who, unbeknownst to Lois Lane, is a reporter. Suppose that
Superman is now very salient - more so than anyone Lois knows
to be a reporter. He is thus the most salient reporter - yet
he is not the individual denoted by "the reporter" when Lois
utters that description. Not unless in his guise as Clark
Kent, he is the most salient reporter.
Modified MST can easily accommodate such cases. Because Lois
Lane does not believe that the individual she has come to know
as Superman is a reporter, it would be inappropriate for her
to use "the reporter" to refer to Superman when he is in his
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Superman guise - even if he is (unbeknownst to Lois) the most
salient of the reporters. For in such a guise he would nor.t be
"the most salient of the reporters not most appropriately
denoted in some other way." He would (under such conditions)
be most appropriately denoted (by Lois) in some other way
via (e.g.) "Superman." However, were Superman in his Clark
Kert guise, it might well be appropriate for Lois to denote
him via "the reporter" - assuming, of course, that she
believes that the individual she has come to know as Clark
Kent is a reporter. For in that particular guise, Superman
might well be the most salient of the reporters not most
appropriately denoted in some other way.4C 41
It looks, then, as though modified MST provides a rather
promising semantic account of expressions of the form "the F."
We have just seen that it accommodates a class of cases that
the original version of the theory was unable to accommodate.
And, of course, modified MST would have no problem accounting
for those cases where the referent of "the F" appears to be
the most salient of the F's (in the domain of discourse). For
in such cases, the referent - the most salient of the F's -
will of course be the most salient of the F's not most
appropriately denoted in some other way.
However, it has thus far been assumed - either eiplicitly or
implicitly - that the entity specified by modified MST is also
the intended referent. It has been assumed, that is, that the
two converge. Now Lewis' (revised) theory makes no mention of
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referential intentions; it thus seems plausible to suppose
that 'he believes that they are semantically irrelevant - that
they have no bearing on what gets secured as the referent of a
definite description.4 : For he appears to believe that what
makes some entity the referent of an occurrence of "the F"' is
simply its being the most salient of the F's not most
appropriately denoted in some other way. But because the cases
thus far considered have involved a conrvergerce of the
intended referent and the most salient of the F's not most
appropriately denoted in some other way, such cases fail to
indicate whether it is the intention (to refer to a particular
F) or the maximal salience (of a particular F) that is doing
the semantic work. For all such cases indicate to the
contrary, it is possible that the referent of an occurrence of
"the F" is determined (at least in some cases4m ) by the
speaker's intention to refer to a particular F. It would thus
be consistent with such cases to suppose that the reference of
definite descriptions - most plausibly "incomplete
descriptions" - is (at least in part) a matter of intentions.
Although such a view may turn out to be mistaken, it does have
some intuitive plausibility in its favor, and it is, moreover,
consistent with the data thus far considered in evaluating
Lewis' modified MST.
In order to adjudicate between the two views: the intentional
view and modified MST, we need to look at what happens when
the intended F and the most salient of the F's not most
appropriately denoted in some other way, diverge. Intuitions
1:1)
about which, if either, entity emerges as the (semantic)
referent, will provide data enabling us to adjudicate between
the two views. Such cases will be considered in the next
section.
7. Problems with Modified MST
Before looking at cases involving a divergence of the sort
described above, a point concerning "'salience" needs to be
clarified. According to (modified) MST, the sort of salience
relevant to fixing the referent of some (token) description,
is what might be termed "shared salience": salience from the
point of view of speaker and audience. Thus, in the context of
Lewis' (modified) theory, to say, for instance, that a certain
F is "the most salient of the F's" (in the domain of
discourse) is to imply that this particular F is maximally
salient from the point of view of the speaker as well as the
audience. Lewis suggests that this is indeed his view, when he
proposes that "the F" means "the F most salient to us" (where
"us" refers to speaker and audience). 4 4
What I would like to turn to now are cases 'Achere there appears
to be a divergence between the particular F the speaker
intends to refer to, and the most salient of the F's not most
appropriately denoted in some other way. (It will be important
to bear in mind here that tie "salience" in question is
supposed to be shared salience.) The sorts of cases I have ir'
mind are those where there is clearly an intended F - but
apparently nothing that could be accurately described as "the
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most salient of the F's not most appropriately denoted in some
other way." Consider an utterance of sentencr.ý (5~: "The
schnauzer got into a fight with Fido." Now suppose that the
particular schnauzer that the speaker intends to refer to
(Witz), is not the schnauzer the addressee takes him to be
reterring to (Strupp). (This would presumably involve a case
where the audience's salience ranking is not what the speaker
tal;es it to be.) Suppose further that the intended schnauzer
(Witz) did in fact get into a fight with Fido. Intuitively,
the utterance was true: what the speaker literally said was
true, and was true because a certain schnauzer (Witz) did in
fact get into a fight with Fido. That the addressee was unable
to correctly identify the intended referent, would not appear
to prohibit the utterance from coming out true. Witz, then,
would appear to be the semantic referent of "the schnauzer"' -
since what makes the utterance true, is (apparently) a certain
fact about Witz. But is Witz the "most salient of the
schnauzers r ot most appropriately denoted in some other way"?
(That, of c)ourse, is what modified MST would predict.) Not if
the salience in question is thought of as shared salience.
Aftei all, the addressee has identified Strupp as the intended
referenc - which would suggest that - from his/her point of
view, Strupp is that dog. On the other hand, since Witz is the
intended dog, it is plausible to suppose that he is - from the
point of view of the speaker - the most salient of the
schnauzers not >st appropriately denoted i 1 some other way.
(BecausE forming an in;ention to refer to a certain F would
82
naturally increase the salience of that F from the speaker 's
point of view, it is difficult, if riot impossible, to come up
with cases where the intended referent would be one entity,
and the most salient of the F's from the speaker's point of
view, another entity. Perhaps, then, whenever the two diverge,
the scenario will be one in which there is simply rn(; entity
answering to the latter description. 4 0)
It would, incidentally, be of no use to attempt to invoke an
(appropriately modified) version of Lewis' "rule of
accommodation" here. For it is quite pos'-ible that, were the
description in question to denote Strupp (not Witz), the
utterance would still be "acceptable": true, warranted, non-
trivial. After all, perhaps Strupp (like Witz) did get into a
fight with Fido - and perhaps the speaker has some gl ounds for
supposing this to be so. There is accordingly no reason to
suppose that the comparative salience of the two dogs must
shift in such a way as to ma.ke Witz the semantic referent of
the description.
What cases such as the foregoing appear to suggest, is that
the intention to refer to a particular F via an utterance of
"the F" is - at least on certain crccasions - a factor in
determining the semantic referent of that expression. Shared
salience would seem to be (semantically) irrelevant. And while
it is plausible to suppose that the referent of such an
expression will be the most salient F from the point of view
of the speaker, this is perhaps only because where the speaker
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has an intention to refer to some entity, that entity will
naturally become salient from the speaker's point of view.
Salience from the audience's point of view, would likewise
appear to be of no semantic significance - not even
derivatively. Rather, such salience would appear to be of no
more than pragmatic significance. For if the intended F is the
F most salient from the point of view of the addressee, the
latter will be in a position to identify that entity as the
intended referent, and to thus correctly interpret the
spealker's utterance.
8. Some Responses
There are several ways in which a proponent of modified MST
might respond to the foregoing. Recently, Lewis has suggestited
the following approach. 4 4 Suppose that "the F" does in fact
mean (something like) "the F most salient to us" (where "us"
designates speaker and audience). Now in the normal,
presupposed sort of case, there is a certain F that is most
salient to both speaker and audience - and this is common
knowledge between them. And, in such cases, the F in question
will be the denotation of "the F." ' (Lewis here sets aside.
cases of maximally salient F's most appropriately denoted in
some other way. I will follow suit in the discussion that
follows.) However, what happens when the case is abnornmal -
when the audience's salience ranking is not what the speaker
takes it to be? Does at follow that the description is without
a denotation? It doesn't seem so (according to Lewis). After
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all, a description may denote what it doesn't quite describe,
provided the denotation comes "close enough, and closer than
any alternative," to satisfying the description. For instance,
it is not implausible to suppose that "the king of Iraq"
denotes Hussein even though he is, strictly, speaking, not a
"king." 4 7 (Lewis acknowledges that this is apt to be a messy
business, with indeterminacy about what does and does not come
"close enough.") Thus, if the presupposition of shared
salience breaks down, several possibilities arise. Perhaps
"the F" denotes (in a not fully indeterminate way) the F most
salient to the speaker; or the F the speaker wrongly thinks is
most salient to the audience;4W or (perhaps) the F most
salient to the audience but not to the speaker.
My response to any such approach is two-fold. First, it seems
to me more natural to account for cases of the sort in
question - cases where the description does not quite describe
the intended referent, in terms of the familiar Kripkean
speaker's reference/semantic reference distinction. Consider,
for instance, an utterance of "The king of Iraq is a dangerous
man," where the description is used to refer to Hussein - whom
the speaker wrongly believes to be a king. In that case, it
seems plausible to suppose that while the speaker may have
referred to Hussein, the description was itself without a
referent. One could then account for the intuition that, in
uttering the sentence in question, something true was (in some
sense) said, though, strictly speaking, the utterance was not
true. For while the speaker referred to Hussein, and said
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something true of him, the definite description was without a
semantic referent, and the utterance was therefore not true.
For reasons of this sort, it seems to me rather implausible to
suppose that "the VF" might refer to something that was not the
F most salient to us - assuming that the ex;pression means "the
F most salient to us." This would not, however, prevent the
speaker from referring (via "the F") to some entity not
properly described as "the most salient of the F's not most
appropriately denoted in some other way."
Second, even supposing that it is true that a description
might denote what it doesn't quite describe, it wouldn't
follow that "the F" could ever denote something nrot most
salient to the speaker and audience - on the assumption that
it means "the F most salient to us." For if this sort of
situation were possible - then, as Lewis suggests, it would
occur only when the description comes "close enough and.closer
than any alternative" to describing its alleged referent. But
if this alleged referent is ncrt maximally salient from the
point of view of speaker and audience - then could it actually
come "close enough, and closer than any alternative" to
satisfying the description? I don't think so. Consider an
utterance of "The man standing closest to Mary and Jane is
Fred." Now suppose that while Fred is the man standing closest
to Mary - Bob is the man standing closest to Jane. Is there
any reason to suppose that Fred - rather than Bob - is the
denotation (the semantic referent) of the description? I don't
think so. After all, the description misdescribes Fred to
E:6
precisely the same extent that it misdescribes Bob. Now
consider an utterance of "The man is Fred." Suppose that the
man most salient to the speaker (the intended man) is Fred;
while the man most salient to the audience, is Bill. (These
are the sorts of cases in question.) Here again, there seems
to be no reason to suppose that "the man" - assuming it mearns
"the man most salient to us" - denotes one man rather than the
other. For so interpreted, the description comes just as close
to (accurately) describing Bill as it does to describing Fred.
Thus, even supposing (with Lewis) that a description can on
occasion denote what it doesn't quite describe, it does'not
follow that (if modified MST is correct) an occurrence of "the
F" can ever denote anything other than an F which is max:imally
salient from the point of view of both speaker and audience.
For as indicated above, where there is an absence of shared
salience, there is no entity that "the F" will come "closer
than any alternative" to describing.4" Specifically, if one F
is maximally salient from the point of view of the speaker -
while another F is maximally salient from the point of view of
the audience - an occurrence of "the F" ("the F most salient
to( us") will describe the one just as accurately as it
describes the other. It will accordingly denote neither.
Another recent attempt to defend modified MST involves an
appeal to the speaker reference/semantic reference distinction
invoked above. The general idea can be spelled out as follows.
Consider again an utterance of "The schnauzer got into a fight
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with Fido." Suppose (as described above) that while the
intended referent (Witz) is, from the point of view of the
speaker, the most salient of the schnauzers, Strupp is the
most salient such dog from the point of view of the audience.
It was suggested (by the author) that the semantic referent of
the description was the intended referent - contrary to what
modified MST would seem to predict. According MST, it would
seem (contra Lewis) that the description should be without a
denotation, and the utterance therefore not true. For there is
an absence of shared salience - something allegedly essential
to the meaning of "the F." Now here's the proposed defense of
modified MST.O0 One way to account for the intuitions
surrounding cases of the sort in question would be to suppose
that, while the speaker's referent is a certain F, there is in
fact no semantic referent - just as modified MST would appear
to predict. For the description accurately describes nothing
(due to an absence of shared salience). Thus, that an
utterance of sentence (5), made under the specified
conditions, would seem to be true just in case Witz got into a
fight with Fido, is easily accounted for: The speaker referred
to, and said truly of Witt, that he got into a fight with
Fido. But again, since the description was without a semantic
referent, the utterance itself (what was literally said) was
not actually true.
Although this sort of move may have some initial plausibility,
there are also some serious problems with it. If correct, then
it follows that the truth value of an utterance of "The F is
G" will depend, in part, upon whether or not the addressee is
able to correctly identify the intended referent. And such an
entailment seems rather implausible. Consider once again an
utterance of (5): "The schnauzer got into a fight with Fido."
Suppose, as above, that the addressee misidentifies the
intended referent as Strupp. This would mean that Strupp was
the most salient schnauzer from the point of view of the
addressee. But since the intended referent is Witz, that
schnauzer is most plausibly the most salient schnauzer from
the point of view of the speeker. There is thus an absence of
shared salience, and accordingly (on the view under
consideration) no semantic referent. What the speaker said (if
he "said" anything at all) was not true. But now suppose that
the addressee was able to correctly identify the intended
referent as Witz. That would mean that Witz was the schnauzer
most salient from the point of view of speaker and audience.
It would then follow (on the view under consideration) that
what the speaker said was true - assuming that Witz did in
fact get into a fight with Fido. But it seems imnlausible to
suppose that the tr'uth value of an utterance of "The F is 0"
is going to depend (in the end) on whether or not the audience
is in a position to identify the intended F. After all, in the
case where the addressee misidentifies the intended F, we are
apt to say that he simply didn't understand what the speaker
actually said. We certainly are no:,t apt to say that the
speaker's utterance was untrue, as the addressee didn't know
which F the speaker was talking about."~ Considerations of
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this sort are captured in Evans' remark that, "...the only
question the hearer can intelligently ask himself in
attempting to disambiguate the reference [of an expression
whose referent is conventionally underdetermined] is 'Which
one does the speaker intend?'"mm
One final attempt to defend modified MST against cases of the
sort in question might involve an appeal to an analysis of the
sort proposed by Lewis in Couriterfactuals. There, Lewis spoke
of sentences of the form "The F is G" as being true or false
at i - where i was an entity with a "point of view."•"
Specifically, he claimed that such a sentence would be true at
i just in case the most salient F at (from the point of view
of) i, was G. Perhaps this sort of approach could be extended
to utterances of such sentences - with i being the speaker.
Thus, perhaps we could say that an utterance of "The F is G"
will be true just in case the most salient F at i (the
speaker) is G.
In order to adjudicate between the foregoing, and a view which
claims that the irtertion to refer to a particular F, is (at
least in some cases) what determines the referent of an
occurrence of "the F," one needs to look at cases where the
most salient F at i and the intended F, diverge. But are there
any such cases? Initially, it might be thought that there are
not. After all, if the speaker has an intention to refer to a
certain F, isn't it plausible to suppose that that F - being
the object of the speaker's referential intention - will be
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the most salient F at i? Recall Lewis' claim (in
Co aurnter factuals) that entities are salient at i in so far as
they "loom larger in his mental life; they are more important
to him; they come more readily to the center of his
attention." However, even with this explicitly psychological
notion of salience, it seems at least possible that there
might be a divergence of the sort in question. Consider once
again, an utterance of (5): "The schnauzer got into a fight
with Fido." Suppose, as above, that it is the speaker's
intention to refer to Witz. But suppose that the utterance is
made rather absent-mindedly, and that the speaker's thoughts
are of another schnauzer - Strupp - whom she is now observing
through,the window as he growls menacingly at the convalescing
Fido. The intuitions here are surely that the utterance
concerned Witz - despite the fact that more of the speaker's
mental energy was taken up with thoughts of Strupp. Though the
speaker was thinking (primarily) of Strupp, she was speaking
of Witz.
If the foregoing does in fact represent a case where there is
a divergence between the intended F and the F maximally
salient at i, then intuitions would seem to favor a view which
regards intentions (rather than salience) as semantically
relevant to the reference of descriptions. But suppose, if
only for the sake of argument, that there simply cannot be
cases where the intended F and the maximally salient F at i
diverge. Even then, I think an argument could be given for
favoring the intentional view over the maximal salience view.
01
The basic idea is this. With respect to an utterance of "The F
is G," the speaker's referential intention has a certain
"explanatory priority" over the maximal salience of the
intended referent. Thus, it would make sense to state a theory
of the reference of definite descriptions in terms of
speaker's intentions - rather than in terms of maximal
salience (at i). The reason for supposing that the intention
has an explanatory priority here, is that a particular F will
might well become a maximally salient F, as a result of the
speaker's forming a referential intention concerning that F.
For prior to an utterance of "The F is G," several F's might
conceivably be tied for maximal salience. The speaker then
forms an intention to refer to (and say something of) one of
these equally salient F's. And it seems plausible to suppose
that what breaks the tie is the. referential intention. Yet the
reverse does not happen: it is never the case that a
particular F will become the intended F simply as a result of
its being the maximally salient F (at i). For the speaker will
always have to option of referring to some other F - or of
saying nothing at all.l 4
9. Conclusions
Considerations such as the foregoing suggest (though by no
means prove) that, in at least some situations, what makes a
particular F the semantic referent of an occurrence of "the F"
is its being the F the speaker inrternds to refer to. However,
is not dificult to find further support for this view. Recall
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cases of the sort that Lewis claimed operated in accordance
with his "rule of accommodation." Recall in particular the
utterance of "The cat is going to pounce on you." Lewis
suggested that description referred to the cat in the room
(rather than the cat in New Zealand) because the presumed
acceptability (truth, warrantedness) of the utterance required
that the former be the denotation of the description. The
proposed analysis was at least in accordance with the
intuition that the cat in the room was indeed the denotation.
But it seemed at least as plausible to suggest that the cat in
the room emerged as the denotation of the description -
because that was the cat that the speaker intended to denote
by means of the description. Further support for the latter
interpretation comes from a consideration of utterances which
are in fact unacceptable. Recall Bob's utterance of "The cat
spends most of his time in New Zealand." The problem was that
Bob believed wrongly - that the intended cat (also the cat
most salient just before t) was Lewis' New Zealand cat. And
surely we would thus wish to say that Bob's utterance was
false - and that the intended cat was the semantic referent of
the description. But if we apply Lewis' rule to the case in
question (as the facts of the case demand that we do), then
Bob's utterance comes out true - with the New Zealand cat
emerging as the semantic referent. And that, surely, is not
what we want.
It was suggested earlier that Lewis might attempt to get
around difficulties of the foregoing sort by claiming that the
0"*.r
rule operates only on under certain "normal conditions" (hence
the "ceteris paribus and within certain limits" proviso). He
might then claim that "normal conditions" would not obtain
unless the intended F and the most salient of the F's most
appropriately denoted in some other way, converge. The problem
with any such move is clear. To asrume, to stipulate, that the
two entities are in fact one and the same - that they converge
- is, in effect, to rule out any possibility of adjudicating
between quite different types of theory. For if such
convergence is assumed, then there is simply no way of telling
whether it is the intention or the maximal salience that is
doing the semantic work: that is securing a certain entity as
the semantic referent of the description. But when we look at
cases where there at least appears to be a divergence of the
sort in question, it looks as though referential intentions --
and not maximal salience - are what matters semantically.n "6
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DEMONSTRATING WITH DESCRIPTIONS
1. Preliminaries
According to David Kaplan's new view on the demonstration/
demonstratum relation, it is the "directing intention" - and
not the accompanying demonstration - that determines the
demonstratum of a perceptual demonstrative: a demonstrative
used to "pick out" an object or individual in the perceptual
field. 1 (That the demonstration determines the demonstratum is
Kaplan's old view on the relation in question.2 ) This
"directing intention" refers to the speaker's intention to
demonstrate a perceived object or individual on which he has
focused. The intention is said to be a directing one, as it is
thought to direct (in a teleological sense) the forthcoming
demonstration. o The demonstratum of the demonstrative
e:ipression will be the object or individual toward which the
speaker has this directing intention. The demonstration itself
will play no role at all in fixing the demonstratum. Its only
role (according to Kaplan) is the pragmatic one of
facilitating communication: of making it clear to the audience
which object or individual is being spoken about.
Thus, if I intend to demonstrate Fred (the perceived
individual on whom I have focused) while uttering "That man is
Fred," then ipso facto, Fred gets secured as the demonstratum
of "that man." That would be so even if my accompanying
demonstration (a pointing gesture, suppose) were somewhat off-"
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target, resulting in the unwitting demonstration of the nearby
Bill. In such a case, communication might well be compromised;
the audience might wrongly take Bill to be the man about whom
I was speaking. But Fred - being the intended demonstratum -
would nevertheless emerge as the actual demonstratum. Or so
says the proponent of the directing intention theory of
perceptual demonstratives.
One of the benefits of this directing intention view is
(according to Kaplan) that it "offers a new perspective on one
of Donnellan's most compelling cases of referential use.'"
Kaplan illustrates this alleged benefit by appealing to the
now classic scenario in which a man drinking water from a
martini glass is referred to as "the man drinking a martini."
(The speaker believes falsely that the liquid in the man's
glass is gin.) Kaplan's analysis goes something like this. A
referentially used "the man drinking a martini" is to be
parsed as "that, the man drinking a martini," where the
appositive description is to be taken as a kind of
"demonstration" - a way of effecting communication which is
without semantic significance. The hidden demonstrative
pronoun "that" is to be taken as the actual demonstrative -
the expression with a corresponding demonstratum - viz, the
man the speaker irntends to demon.strate by way of the definite
description. Thus, if the speaker intends to demonstrate the
man in question, then that man is the demonstratum of the
hidden "that," even if the description (the demonstration)
doesn't quite fit - even if (in terms more suitable to
10 C)
ostensive gestures) the "demonstration" is slightly "aoff-
target." Kaplan sums up the case in question as follows:
.... the speaker had a demonstrative intention and,
constrained by the conventions of polite behavior,
substituted a description for the usual pointing. The
slight misdescription has no more effect on the
determination of the referent of a tacit perceptual
demonstrative than would a slight error in aim have on
the determination of the referent of a vocalized
demonstrative accompanied by pointing. In both cases, the
referent is properly determined by the perceptual
intention. In neither case is anything semantical at
stake in the description or the pointing. All that is at
stake is the accuracy of communicating what is said.'
(emphasis mineb)
In what follows, I will be concerned with Kaplan's general
analysis of perceptual demonstratives, as well as with his
demonstrative analysis of referentially used descriptions. 7 In
section 2, I will spell out one of the chief advantages of
Kaplan's analysis of perceptual demonstratives - an advantage
which extends to his demonstrative analysis of referentially
used descriptions. I will then, in section 3, draw attention
to a difficulty which infects both analyses: the analysis of
perceptual demonstratives, as well as the analysis of
referentially used descriptions. In section 4, I will propose
two (distinct) alternative treatments of perceptual
demonstratives/referentially used descriptions. The proposed
treatments will be recommended on the grounds that they
accommodate the phenomena which support, as well as the
phenomena which undermine, Kaplan's peir of analyses. In
section 5, I will briefly summarize the pros and cons of each
of the three views in question. I will then argue, in section
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6, that if either of the proposed alternatives is correct,
then Kaplan's appositive analysis of referentially used
descriptions must be wrong. I will then suggest that a
demonstrative analysis of referentially used descriptions of
the sort proposed by Kaplan in "Dthat,"a is more in line with
the linguistic data. And finally, I will conclude in section 7
with a brief discussion of the continuing debate between the
Russellians and the Referentialists - the latter of whom claim
that Russell's theory is unable to accommodate the referential
use of definite descriptions. The discussion will involve a
brief comparison of the proposed treatment of referentially
used descriptions, with other possible treatments of such
expressions.
2. An Advantage of Kaplan's New View
One of the chief advantages of Kaplan's general view of
perceptual demonstratives, is that it accounts for the
intuition that a slightly off-target demonstration (whether
effected by ostension or description) is not going to prevent
the intended demonstratum from emerging as the actual
demonstratum. Suppose I utter "That man is Fred," while
pointing (unwittingly) to a mosquito several inches from
Fred's left ear. Suppose further that Fred is standing among a
group of other men, though he is clearly the man closest to
the place designated by the pointing gesture. 9 The fact that
the demonstration is slightly off-target, is apparently not
going to prevent the intended demonstratum from being secured
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as the actual demonstr3tum. For the utterance will, it seems,
be true just in case the individual I intended to point to (a
particular mar,) is in fact Fred. Similarly, suppose I utter
"The man drinking a martini is Bill," using the description to
demonstrate a man who (unbeknownst to me) is actually drinking
water from a martini glass. Suppose further that there are no
other men in the range of perception who are drinking
martinis, or beverages that might conceivably be mistaken for
martinis. 10 Intuitively, the fact that the demonstration (the
description) was not quite accurate, is not going to prevent
the utterance from coming out true. For intuitively, the
utterance will be true just in case the in'ternded demonstratum
(the man drinking water from a martini glass) is in fact
Bill. *
IKaplan's intentional view of perceptual demonstratives has the
advantage of being able to accommodate the intuitions
surrounding the cases described above. For on that view, the
demonstration is not what determines the demonstratum - the
intention is, The demonstration (whether a gesture or a
description) is without semantic significance; it has only the
pragmatic function of enabling the audience to identify the
intended (and hence actual) demonstratum. Thus, if the
demonstration is a bit off-target, that will not prevent the
intended demonstratum from emerging as the actual
cldemonstratum. At most, it will compromise communication. That
such a view is in fact correct, is precisely what cases of the
sort described above seem 'o show.
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3. A Disadvantage of Kaplan's New View
The most obvious difficulty with Kaplan's directing intention
analysis of perceptual demonstratives, is that it doesn't
account for intuitions associated with cases where the
demonstration (whether effected by ostension or description)
is way off the intended mark.£L Part of the intuitive
plausibility attaching to Kaplan's new view of perceptual
demonstratives derives from his exclusive consideration of
cases where the demonstration is only slightly off the mark.
Once we begin to look at cases where the demonstration is way
off-target, the untenability of Kaplan's directing intention
view becomes clear.
Let's begin by looking at cases where the demonstration is
effected by means of ostension. As I have discussed such cases
at length in "Three Views of Demonstrative Reference," 1 = I
will be brief. Suppose that you are presented with two candy
bars - a Hershey bar and a Mr. Goodbar. You are asked to
choose one of them. You have a strong preference for the Mr.
Goodbar (which comes in a yellow wrapper), and so opt for that
one. You then 'focus' on the bar in the yellow wrapper, which
you intend to grab. You then act on this intention, making a
grab for the desired bar. EBut your aim isn't so good, and you
say, just as you mistakenly pick up the bar in the bro';,
wrapper (the Hershey bar), "I'll take this one." Now what have
you just said? Surely, you have just said - contrary to your
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intentions - that you will take the Hershey bar: the bar you
have demonstrated by means of your gesture. But Kaplan's view
would seem to predict otherwise. For according to that view,
the actual demonstratum is in all cases the intended
demonstratum: the perceived object or individual on which the
speaker has "focused", and which he intends to demonstrate.
And so that view would seem to predict that you said - just as
you intended to - that you will take the Mr. Goodbar. Of
course, the audience would no doubt assume that you said you
would take the Hershey bar. But (on Kaplan'= view) any such
assumption would simply reflect a misunderstanding on the part
of the audience, due to a breakdown in communication. In the
case in question, the demonstration simply failed to fulfill
its pragmatic function: to facilitate communication by
indicating which object/ individual was being talked about.
One might be inc3ined to defend Kaplan's view here by fiddling
a bit with the notion of "intended demonstratum". Suppose we
think of the intended demonstratum roughly as follows. The
intended demonstratum will be the entity about which the
speaker intends to say something in uttering "...D...," where
"D" is some demonstrative ex:pression. When the speaker utters
"I'll take this one," in the scenario described above, he
intends to say something of the candy bar in his hand, the
Hershey bar; he intends to say of it, that he'll take it. The
difficulty is, he wrongly believes that candy bar to be the
Mr. Goodbar. But since the intended demonstratum - the object
about which the speaker intended to say something via an
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utterance of "I'll take this orne" - turns out to be the
demonstrated bar, Kaplan's intentional view of perceptual
demonstratives makes the correct prediction: What was actually
said concerned the demonstrated bar - the Hershey bar.
There are, I think, a number of difficulties with this
proposed defense of Kaplan's position, but I'll restrict my
comments to what I take to be the most serious of these. As I
understand Kaplan's "directing intention" position, the
intention that determines the demonstratum is supposed to be
an intention formed antecedently to the issuing of the
demonstration. (This is so regardless of whether the
demonstration is an ostensive gesture or a referential
utterance of some description.) That is, the speaker forms a
certain demonstrative intention; as a result (or partial
result) of this intention, a demonstration is issued. • 4 The
demonstratum of the verbal demonstrative will then be the
object of the intention which resulted in the demonstration.
In the case in question, this intention clearly concerned the
Mr. Goodbar; it was the intention to demonstrate that bar,
that resulted in the grabbing gesture, which amounted to an
unwitting demonstration of the Hershey bar. Kaplan's view
does, then, make the wrong prediction. The difficulty with the
defense sketched above, is that it disregards a crucial aspect
of Kaplan's "directing intention." Specifically, it fails to
take into consideration the idea that the intention that
determines the demonstratum is formed antecedently to the
issuing of the demonstration.
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So much for cases involving wide of the mark ostensive
gestures. Now let's consider cases where a wide of the mark
demonstr;ation is effected by means of a referentially used
description. Consider a party scenario involving you, your
companion, and several other couples. You and your companion
have focused attention on a particular (man/woman) couple. You
then focus your attention exclusively on the man - whom you
have mistaken for a woman. (You have also managed to mistake
the woman for a man). This person, the man you have mistaken
for a woman, reminds you of Tracy Ulman, and so you turn to
your companion and say to him, "The woman looks just like
Tracy Ulman," all the while intending to say of the man that
he looks like Tracy Ulman.
Now my intuitions (which I take to be widely shared) are that
you have just said, literally, that the womar, (of the couple
in question) looks like Tracy Ulman - despite your intentions
to say this about the man. Admittedly, the intuitions here are
not as strong as they are in the case involving ostension
described above. There, it seemed absolutely clear that what
the speaker actually said, concerned the hershey bar - the
object demonstrated, rather than Mr. Goodbar - the object the
speaker intended to demonstrate. Somehow, the intuitions
surrounding the case in question appear somewhat less clear;
it is nriot quite as clear that the speaker, in uttering "The
woman...," using the description to refer to the man, did
indeed say something about the woman.
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But this difference in the relative strength of the intuitions
in question, is easily accounted for. An account can be
provided in terms of Kripke's speaker's reference/semantic
reference distinction.' " In the case now in question, there is
a clear divergence between the semantic referent of "the
woman" - the entity whose properties are relevant to the
truth-value of the utterance - and the speaker's referent
associated with the referential utterance of that description.
The semantic referent is (according to Kripke) determined by
certain linguistic conventions" ,; the speaker's referent is
the entity the speaker believes satisfies the conditions for
being the semantic referent. Thus, the former is the woman,
the latter is the man. For the linguistic conventions in
question presumably dictate that "the woman" will refer to a
woman, and the speaker falsely believes that the man is a
woman. The intuition that what was literally said concerned
the woman, is a bit weak simply because the speaker did in
fact refer to the man via "the woman." Moreover, we could
perhaps even say that the speaker said of the man that he
looked just like Tracy Ulman. However, because the semantic
referent was the woman, what was literally said, concerned
her, not the man.
But in the case involving the way off-target gesture, the
divergence between the speaker's referent and the semantic
referent is not nearly so clear-cut. What seems clear, is that
the semantic referent of "this one," in the utterance of "I'll
take this one," is the demonstrated candy bar. After all, what
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the speaker literally said was concerned the Hershey bar. What
is not so clear is the identity of the speaker's referent.
What is the speaker's referent in this case? Kripke
characterizes the speaker's re+erent as (roughly) the
object/individual the speaker believes fulfills the conditions
for being the semantic referent - the latter of which ijs
determined by certain linguistic conventions. Now presumably,
the linguistic conventions are such that the semantic referent
of "this one," will be the demonstrated one. And so the
speaker's referent will be the entity the speaker believes is
the demonstrated one. "he difficulty is that the speaker
believes that the bar he has grabbed is the demonstrated bar.
But he also believes this of the intended demonstratum - the
object of his "directing intention." For he believes (falsely)
that the intended demonstratum (the Mr. Goodbar) is the bar he
has grabbed. There is thus no clear and obvious divergence
here between speaker's reference and semantic reference. It
shouldn't be particularly surprising then, that there is
little temptation to suppose that what the speaker (literally)
said concerned the intended demonstratum: an object he failed
to demonstrate. For it is not obvious that there is any clear
sense in which the speaker referred to that object, and said
of it that he would take it. And so it is not obvious that
speaker's reference and semantic reference diverge here. No
wonder then, that there is little or no doubt that what the
speaker said concerned the demonstrated bar.
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Back now to the particular case in question: the case of the
referentially used "the woman." As I've been suggesting, in
uttering "The woman...," using the description to refer to the
man of a particular man/woman couple, what the speaker
literally says concerns the woman - not the man. Suppose now
that we adopt Kaplan's view that the referentially used
description is actually a disguised demonstrative pronoun,
with the description itself playing the role of the
demonstration. If the demonstration is of merely pragmatic
significance, with the intention doing all of the semantic
work, that would mean that the man - and not the woman
emerges as the demonstratum of the demonstrative expression.
But that, surely, is not the desired result. For it would seem
implausible to suppose that despite clearly demonstrating the
woman with the referentially used description, the man was
nevertheless secured as the demonstratum of the disguised
demonstrative pronoun, and that you (the speaker) accordingly
said precisely what you intended to say - which was something
about the man. After all, you "pointed" directly at the woman
via your utterance of "The woman looks just like Tracy Ulman."
It would seem odd in the extreme to blame your companion's
natural assumption that you had just said something about a
particular woman, on the putative fact that he simply failed
to unders~and what you had actually said - due to your wide of
the mark demonstration. But that is precisely what the
proponent of the "directing intention" view is going to be
forced to say. For you focused your attention on the manr, - th••e
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individual you intended to demonstrate - and it was your
intention to demonstrate that individual, that resulted in
your demonstration: your referential utterance of "the woman."
The conclusion to draw from the foregoing considerations is
clear; Kaplan's "directing intention" theory of perceptual
demonstratives is vitiated by its failure to accommodate cases
where the demonstration is more than just slightly aff-target.
It is time to pursue some alternative approach.
4. Two Alternative Approaches
In view of the phenomena discussed in sections 2 and 3 above,
one might be inclined to reason as follows. Suppose we choose
to adopt Kaplan's general view that referentially used
descriptions ought to be treated as disguised demonstratives,
with the descriptions functioning as demonstrations. In that
case, there is no difficulty accounting for the various
examples discussed above. One need only adopt the view that
demonstrations are semantically significant - whether they are
effected by ostension or by description. Specifically, no
object/individual gets secured as the demonstratum of a
pFrr-ceptual demonstrative, unless it is che object/individual
actually demonstrated. 7"' In the candy bar scenario, the
demonstratum of "this one" in the speaker's utterance of "I'll
take this one," is the candy bar actually demonstrated - not
the one that the speaker intended to demonstrate. Similarly,
in the party scenario, the demonstratum of the hidden
demonstrative pronoun associated with the referentially used
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"the woman," is the individual actually demonstrated by means
of the description - the woman, not the man (the intended
demonstratum).
The same treatment (one might suppose) could be applied to
those cases where the demonstration is only slightly off-
target. In the case where the speaker points to a mosquito
several inches from Fred's left ear while uttering "That mar,
is Fred," nothing gets secured as the demonstratum. For no mar
has been demonstrated by the gesture. ("That man" can only
have a demonstrated mar as its demonstratum.) Thus, while the
speaker intended to demonstrate a particular man, and to say
of that man that he was Fred, he actually failed to do so -
due to the off-target character of his demonstration. The
intuition that the speaker did in fact succeed in saying of a
certain man, that he was Fred, is easily accounted for.
Because the demonstration was only slightly off-target
(perhaps imperceptibly so), we make the charitable - but false
- assumption that the demonstration actually hit the intended
mark, and that the speaker thus said just what he intended to
say. 1" Similar considerations could perhaps be applied to the
case involving the water-imbibing man mistakenly described as
"the man drinking a martini." Here, the demonstration (the
description) fails to demonstrate anything; for there is no
man, in the perceptual field, who is drinking a martini. Thus,
nothing gets secured as the demonstratum, and no determinate
statement is made. The intuition that the speaker did in fact
succeed in saying something about the man drinking water, is
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(as above) easily accounted for. Because the demonstration was
only slightly off-target (perhaps imperceptibly so), we make
the charitable - but false - assumption that the demonstration
hit its intended mark, and that the speaker accordingly said
precisely what he intended to say."'
An alternative, and perhaps more plausible approach, might
begin with the same basic assumptions of the preceding
approach. Referentially used descriptions are disguised
demonstratives, with the description functioning as a kind of
demonstration. Moreover, demonstrations are semantically
significant: nothing is secured as the demonstratum unless it
is the object/individual demonstrated. However, in order for
some object/individual x to be demonstrated, the demonstration
needn't hit x dead-center. It need only be close enough to
clearly discrimirnate x. from other objects/individuals in the
perceptual field.
Such a view would make the same predictions as the preceding
view, with respect to those cases where the demonstration is
way off-target, clearly discriminating something other than
the intended demonstratum. But it would make different
predictions with respect to those cases where the
demonstration is only slightly off-target. For if a
demonstration is only slightly off-target, it might still
succeed in clearly discriminatirng the intended demonstratum
from other objects/individuals in the perceptual field. Such a
view thus has the advantage of preserving Kaplan's intuitions
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(which I share) that a slightly off-target demonstration will
not prevent the intended demonstratum from emerging as the
actual demonstratum.
Let's now apply this view directly to the four examples
discussed in sections 2 and 3 above. In the candy bar
scenario, the grabbing of the Hershey bar (while uttering
"this one") clearly discriminates that candy bar from the
other objects in the perceptual field (in particular, from the
Mr. Goodbar). Thus, it is the Hershey bar that emerges as the
demonstratum of "this one." Similarly, in the party scenario,
the referentially used "the woman" clearly discriminates the
woman of a certain couple from the other objects/individuals
in the perceptual field (in particular, from the man of the
couple). Thus, it is the woman who emerges as the demonstratum
of the disguised demonstrative pronoun. In the case where the
speaker utters "That man is Fred," while pointing
(unwittingly) at a mosquito a few inches from Fred's left ear,
the demonstration clearly discriminates Fred from the other
men in the perceptual environment.=" Thus, Fred emerges as the
demonstratum, despite the slightly off-target character of the
demonstration. For Fred is the only marn "within range" of the
demonstration. And finally, in the "man drinking a martini"
scenario, the intended demonstratum emerges as the actual
demonstratum. For the demonstration - the description - though
slightly off-target, succeeds in clearly discriminating the
intended demonstratum from other individuals in the perceptual
field. For no other individuals in that field are men who are
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drinking anything that looks as though it might possibly be a
martinia: No other individuals are "within range" of the
demonstration.
It is important to note that whether a slightly off-target
demonstration succeeds in clearly discriminating the intended
demonstratum from other entities in the perceptual field, is
going to depend crucially upon certain potentially rather
complex contextual factors."x  Consider again the utterance of
"That man is Fred," where the speaker unwittingly points to a
mosquito close to Fred's ear. Suppose now that the mosquito
pointed to is as close to Bill's ear as it is to Fred's. In
that case, the demonstration would not succeed in clearly
discriminating Fred - or Bill - from other men in the
perceptual field. Thus, the demonstrative would emerge without
a demonstratum. The intuition that something was nevertheless
said could then be accounted for by appealing to Kripke's
speaker's reference/semantic reference distinction. Though the
speaker referred to the man via the demonstrative "that man,"
and said of him, that he was Fred, the expression was without
a referent. For therF was no demonstrated marn (only a
demonstrated mosquito). Thus, strictly speaking, no
determinate statemelnt was made. Similar considerations would
seem to hold with respect to an utterance of "The man drinking
a martini is Bill," where the description is used to
demonstrate a man who (unbeknownst to the speaker) happens to
be drinking water. Suppose now that next to the man in
question, there is another man - a man whom the speaker
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assumes is drinking water, but who is in fact drinking a
martini. Suppose further, that this man is the only man in the
perceptual field who is drir3.ring a martini. In that case, the
demonstratum of the hidden demonstrative pronoun associated
with the referentially used description, would be the martini
drinker. For the demonstration - the description - clearly
discriminates that man from other men in the perceptual field.
Because the description accurately and uniquely describes the
martini-drinker, the latter is hit dead-center by the former.
As in the previous case, the intuition that the speaker said
something about the intended referent can be accounted for by
means of K:ripke's distinction. The speaker referred to the
water-drinker, and said of him that he was Bill; the
expression referred to the gin-drinker. Thus, the statement
made will be true just in case the gin-drinker is Bill.
5. Choosing A View
Thus far we have considered three analyses of perceptual
demonstratives. Each of these was coupled with a demonstrative
analysis of referentially used descriptions. Now which of the
three (if any) is the correct view? Kaplan's view, as we have
seen, cannol possibly be correct; for it fails to account for
what happens when a demonstration is wide of its intended
marlk:. The first of the two alternatives discussed in section 4
is more plausible than Kaplan's view. For it makes the right
predictions in scenarios involving wide of the mark
demonstrations. However, its analysis of scenarios involving
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slightly off-target demonstrations seems (to me at least)
somewhat less convincing, though not entirely implausible. 2 2
The second alternative discussed in section 4 strikes me as
the most plausible of the three. For it accommodates
intuitions surrounding scenarios involving demonstrations
which are way off-target; it also accommodates intuitions
surrounding scenarios involving demonstrations which are only
slightly off-target. In particular, it accounts for the
intuition that a slightly off-target demonstration is not
necessarily going to prevent the intended demonstratum from
emerging as the actual demonstratum.
However, as stated, the second alternative is quite sketchy.
Filling it out would require saying more about the conditions
given which a demonstration "clearly discriminates" some
entity from other objects/individuals in the perceptual field.
No doubt, the task will not be an easy one. Several initially
plausible analyses of the conditions in question can be
readily dismissed. For instance, one might suppose that a
demonstration clearly discriminates some entity (some F in the
case of an utterance of "...that F...") just in case the place
it designates is closer to that entity (that F) than it is to
any other (F). But this won't work. Suppose, for instance,
that I paint between Fred and Bill while uttering "That man is
Fred." Suppose further that my pointing gesture is an inch or
so closer to Fred than to Bill. If the two men are yards
apart, Fred will obviously not be clearly discriminated from
the other men in the perceptual field (in particular, from
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Bill). Similar considerations would seem to apply to
demonstrations effected by description. Consider a scenario
involving two tall women: one five foot nine and one five foot
nine and a quarter. Now consider a referential utterance of
"The very tall woman is Johanna." I suppose that the
description "the very tall woman" might be "closer to" the
taller of the two women (Johanna, suppose); but surely the
description is not going to clearly discriminate Johanna from
her shorter companion. Thus, it seems unlikely that the
relevant notion of "clear discrimination" can be spelled out
in the manner suggested above.
Another initially plausible account of the conditions for
"clear discrimination" might proceed as follows. One entity is
"clearly discriminated" from another by means of a
demonstration, just in case a linguistically competent public
observer would have no difficulty in identifying that entity
as the intended demonstratum, on the basis of the
demonstration. But this sort of account won't worl either.
Just consider the case (discussed above) of a referential
utterance of "The man drinking a martini is Bill." Suppose
that the intended demonstratum is drinking water fromn a
martini glass. But suppose that there is another man, in the
perceptual field, who is drinking a martini. And suppose
further that he is the only such man. I suggested above that
the man drinking the martini will be the entity clearly
discriminated by the description, since that description
accurately arid uniquely describes him. But however
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linguistically competent the hypothetical public observer may
be, he may not know that the man drinking water is not
drinking a martini. Thus, he may be unable to (wrongly)
identify the man clearly discriminated by the description as
the intended referent. In that case, the relevant notion of
"clear discrimination" cannot be spelled out in terms of how
the linguistically competent public observer would interpret
the demonstrative utterance.
The difficulty of finding a satisfactory specification of the
conditions in question, might drive some to opt for the view
that a demonstration must be "right on target" in order to
determine a demonstratum. I, however, find the idea that
"clear discrimination" is sufficient to determine a
demonstratum, intuitively plausible. I therefore think that
idea is worth developing. For now, however, I would just like
to present the view as a plausible (if underdeveloped)
alternative to Kaplan's considerably less plausible treatment
perceptual demonstratives.
But there is, of course, no need to choose from among the
three views in question. After all, one might wish to reject
K.aplan's suggestion that referentially used descriptions be
treated as disguised perceptual demonstratives. Other
approaches (e.g. a Russellian approach) are, of course,
available. I, however, find Kaplan's suggestion intuitively
plausible, and thus worthy of consideration. What I do not
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find plausible is the idea that descriptive demonstrations are
without semantic significance.
6. Descriptions as Disguised Demonstratives
If either of the two analyses of perceptual demonstratives
proposed in section 4 is correct: if, that is, demonstrations
are - contra Kaplan - semantically significant in their
capacity to determine demonstrata, then doubt is cast on
Kaplan's appositive analysis of referentially used
descriptions. According to that analysis, the demonstration is
in apposition to the demonstrative pronoun. "Such a term
appears to duplicate the demonstrative syntactically, but its
semantic contribution is to a subordinate, side remark."- "
Consider Kaplan's proposed parsing of a referentially used
"the man drinking a martini." Such an ex:pression gets parsed
as: "that, the man drinking a martini." The appositive
description is no more than a "subordinate, side remark." It
has no bearing on the reference of the preceding demonstrative
pronoun. The latter has its reference determined (according to
::aplan) by the intention of the speaker. The difficulty here
should be clear by now. Suppose we adopt the view that the
referentially used description really contains a hidden
demonstrative pronoun. In that case, "that" appears to refer,
if at all, to the demo•nstrated object/individuaa, and the
description (uttered in a particulir context) is what effects
the demonstration. It therefore appears to be semantically
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crucial: It has a bearing on what gets secured as th9
demonstratum of the hidden demonstrative pronoun.
A not implausible analysis of referentially used descriptions
might thus proceed along the lines suggested in "Dthat."
There, Kaplan suggests that a referentially used "the F"
should perhaps be analyzed as: that E"the F"), where the
description is to be interpreted as the semantically
sigqrificarnt "demonstration" which fixes the demonstratum of
the demonstrative pronoun. (For the sake of simplicity, Kaplan
considers only cases where the intended demonstrat um is the
unique F; he does not consider cases where the descriptive
demonstration is off-center.)
Both of the alternatives proposed in section 4, are consistent
with the foregoing proposal. For both treat referentially used
descriptions as semantically significant demonstrations: as
demonstrations which in some way or other fix the demonstrata
of the hidden demonstrative pronouns they accompany. But the
precise role played by these semantically significant
demonstrations will depend upon which of the two alternatives
is adopted. If the first of the two (which might be called the
"rigid" view) is adopted, then the description will secure x
as the demonstratum, just in case x is the 0r7ly entity in the
perceptual field, accurately described as an F. If the second
of the two alternatives (which might be called the "non-rigid"
view) is adopted, then the description will secure x as the
denmonstratum just in case it is accurate ereough a description
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to clearly discriminate x from the other entities in the
perceptual environment.
7. Concluding Remarks
Suppose that the general picture sketched above is adopted.
Suppose, that is, the referentially used descriptions are
treated as disguised demonstratives, with the descriptions
functioning as a semantically significant demonstrations. What
place would such a proposal have in the debate between the
Russellians and the Referentialists - the latter of whom
challenge the claim that Russell's theory can accommodate the
referential use?
Obviously, the proposed position is anti-Russellian, in so far
as it constitutes a non-Russellian treatment of referentially
used descriptions. However, its resemblance to standard non-
Russellian analyses, is more superficial than might at first
appear. Consider, for instance, Donnellan's proposed analysis
of referentially used descriptions. 24 Donnellan's suggestion
seems to be that - contrary to what the Russellians claim -
the statement made (the proposition literally expressed) by a
referential utterance of "'The F is G1' is of the logical form;
x is G, where "x" is the entity the speaker intends to refer
to via "·the F" - the entity which the speaker "has in mind."'
The proposed view is similar to Donnellan's in so far as it
claims (in effect) that the logical form of the statement made
by a referential utterance of "The F is G '0" is: x is G.
However, unlike the standard Donnellian account, "x" is not
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determined by the intentions/beliefs of the speaker. On the
contrary, it is determined, in part, by certain "linguistic
conventions" - the same sort of linguistic conventions that
determine what Kripke calls the "semantic referent" of an
expression. Just how these linguistic conventions determine
the demonstratum, will, of course, depend upon which of the
two versions of the general view is adopted. If the "rigid"
view is adopted, then the determination is fairly
straightforward. The demonstratum associated with a
referentially used "the F" will be the entity (if any) in the
perceptual environment accurately and uniquely described by
"the F." One could thus say that the demonstratum will be the
Russellian "denotation" of "the F," where the domain of
discourse is restricted to the objects/individuals in the
perceptual environment. If the "non-rigid" view is adopted,
the determination of the demonstratum will be less
straightforward. The demonstratum will be the entity (if any)
in the perceptual environment that the description succeeds in
clearly discriminating from other entities in that
environment. On this view, a demonstratum may be obtained even
if nothing in the perceptual environment is accurately and
uniquely described by the demonstration. That the
demonstration be accurate enrugh to effect a clear
discrimination is all that matters.
The proposed analysis appears to be slightly more akin to a
modified version of Donnellan's account - an account which a
number of referentialists have adopted. According to this
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account, the proposition expressed by a referential utterance
of "The F is G" will be of the logical form: x is 6, where "x"
is the intended referent - and is also an F. If the intended
referent is not an F, the result is reference failure, with
the outcome that no determinate statement is made. On this
modified version of Donnellan's view, the semantic content of
the description is significant in determining the referent of
the description. For it says that no non-F can be the
(semantic) referent of "the F." In this way7 it resembles the
"rigid" version of the proposed treatment of referentially
used descriptions. But again, there is a crucial difference.
For the proposed view does not allow any role for intentions
in determining the identity of the referent. 2 In this way,
the analysis is similar to the standard Russellian one.
No doubt the debate as to which of these various views is
nearest the truth, will continue for a long while. However, it
seems that some of the difficulties which infect Kaplan's new
view on referentially used descriptions, infect both
Donnellan's account, and the more popular modified version of
that account. Donnellan's account is going to make the saame
predictions as Kaplan's, when it comes to the statement made
by a referential utterance of "The F is 0." For Donnellan's
account (as I understand it) claims that the referent of "the
F" will be the intended referent; the entity the speaker hae
"in mind." It will thus make what appear to be the wrong
predictions, in those cases where the description grossly
misdescribes the intended referent. Consider the case
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(discussed above) of the referential utterance of "The woman
looks just like Tracy Ulman." If the description is used to
refer to the man of the man/woman couple in the perceptual
environment, then Donnellan's view claims that the statement
made will be true just in case the mart looks just like Tracy
Ulman. But intuitively, the truth-value of the statement will
depend upon the properties of the woman - not upon those of
the man.
The account given by the modified version of Donnellan's view
seems somewhat more plausible. It claims that, though the
speaker intended to make a statement about the man in
question, no determinate statement was made, since the
description failed to accurately describe the intended
referent. It seems to me, however, that the proposed view (in
either of the two versions) gives the most likely analysis. It
claims that, though the speaker intended to make a statement
about the man, he actually made a statement about the woman, a
statement the truth of which will depend upon the properties
of that woman.
What about a standard Russellian analysis of the case in
question? Because the description is incomplete, let's suppose
that the domain of quantification is contextually delimited to
the entities in the perceptual environment.A' In that case,
the statement made (the proposition literally expressed) by
the utterance in question will be (roughly): There is exactly
one woman and whoever is a woman looks just like Tracy Llman
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(where the domain of quanitification is understood as
contextually restricted). The intuition that a singular
(rather than general) proposition was expressed, could then be
accommodated by invoking the Gricean distinction between the
proposition literally expressed and the proposition meant.
Though the proposition meant (the proposition the speak;er
intended to communicate) was a singular one, the proposition
literally expressed is just as specified by Russell's theory.
The foregoing analysis has several things in its favor. It
predicts that the truth-value of what was actually said, will
depend upon the properties of a particular woman. It also
predicts a divergence between what was literally said, and
what was meant, where the latter is a singular proposition
having a particular man as one of its "constituents." So far,
these predictions seem accurate. However, what seems
questionable is the idea that the proposition literally
expressed is a general, rather than singular proposition. The
implausibility of this idea will be more apparent in a case
where the description is an accurate description of the
intended referent. Suppose that in uttering "The woman looks
just li ke Tracy Ulman," you intended to say something of the
0womanr of the couple in question - a woman who you recognized
as a woman. Now the Russellian is going to predict a
divergence here between what is literally expressed and what
is meant. What is literally expressed will be a certain
general proposition (specified above); what is meant will be a
singular proposition, with a particular woman as one of its
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constituents. But it seems to me that, in this particular
case, there is no divergence between what is literally said
and what is meant: Intuitively, the speaker said precisely
what he meant. This is just what the proposed view of
referentially used descriptions predicts: the proposition
literally expressed, as well as the proposition meant, is a
singular proposition with a particular woman as a constituent.
No doubt the Russellian would be able to muster up some sort
of response to the foregoing, but I don't wish now to get into
a full-blown discussion of whether a Russellian account can
handle all of the relevant linguistic data.'For the point of
this paper was not to take to stand on the dispute between the
Russellians and the Referentialists. Rather it was to argue
that, if one adopts the general view that referentially used
descriptions are disguised perceptual demonstratives (a view
which I find intuitively plausible), then one must treat the
descriptive demonstrations as semantically significant. Such a
view could then be regarded as an application of the more
general, and quite plausible view, that the ostensive gestures
which often accompany verbal demonstratives are (contra
Kaplan) semantically significant. 2 7
SSee "Afterthoughts" in Themes from Kaplan, Almog, Ferry, and
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